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THE SILLINESS OF ERISA: THE PLAN IS NOT THE
ONLY PROPER PARTY DEFENDANT IN AN ERISA
BENEFITS CLAIM
By Donald T. Bogan*

ERISA recites in § 502(d)(1) that a plan can sue and be sued
as an entity. Does such a legislative pronouncement, in and of
itself, establish the plan as a juristic person? Further, does
Congress’s declaration that a plan can be sued suggest that no
other person or entity can be held liable in an ERISA §
502(a)(1)(B) benefits claim? Relying upon ERISA § 502(d)(1),
long-standing authority in the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals,
and in other circuits, holds that the plan, and only the plan, is a
proper party defendant in an ERISA § 502(a)(1)(B) benefits
claim. That is silly.
A plan may be funded or unfunded. If a plan is funded
through a trust, the trustee is a juristic person that controls the
assets of the trust, which assets can be applied to satisfy a §
502(a)(1)(B) judgment. Particularly when a plan is unfunded, it
“owns” no assets. A plan is not a person—it is not an individual
or a partnership, and plans are neither incorporated nor are they
unincorporated associations. A plan is not any kind of
traditionally recognized juristic person. Rather, a plan is a
contract; and a plan participant’s § 502(a)(1)(B) benefits claim
seeks to recover money damages for breach of the plan contract.
The plan sponsor establishes the plan and is the primary
obligor responsible to satisfy the promises it made to covered
workers as detailed in the written plan contract. In order to
enforce the sponsor’s promises and to collect any possible
judgment obtained in a § 502(a)(1)(B) benefits claim, the obligor
under the plan contract (the sponsor), plus any other party that
assumes liability under the plan contract by agreement with the
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plan sponsor (a trustee or an insurer), must be party defendants.
ERISA does not expressly limit the universe of possible
defendants that can be liable in a § 502(a)(1)(B) benefits claim.
In fact, Congress expressly contemplated that there may be
defendants beyond just the plan when it specified in § 502(d)(2)
that any money judgment obtained against a plan shall not be
enforceable against any other person “unless liability against
such person is established in his individual capacity . . .” While a
number of courts have now created some exceptions to the strict
Ninth Circuit rule that only a plan can be sued in a §
502(a)(1)(B) claim, and have allowed benefit claimants to also
sue parties that “control” ERISA claims decisions, these courts
have failed to identify the legal paradigm that supports their
decisions.
At last, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals has recognized
that a plan insurer can be held liable in an ERISA § 502(a)(1)(B)
claim because the insurer is an obligor under the plan contract.
All courts should follow the Seventh Circuit’s lead, and recognize
that a § 502(a)(1)(B) claim seeks legal relief for breach of the plan
contract, with all that holding entails for ERISA benefit claim
processes. With that result, we will the not have to worry, as a
practical matter, whether the plan “entity” is a juristic person.
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I.

INTRODUCTION

One hundred years ago, courts viewed an employer’s
promise to provide an employee fringe benefit—perhaps the
promise of a small living stipend for a loyal worker during the
worker’s retirement—as a promise to make a gift.1 A promise to
make a gift, of course, is generally unenforceable.2 A gift
recipient typically gains rights under the gift promise only after
there has been some transfer of the gift res.3 Consequently, in
the early twentieth century, if a disappointed worker sued his or
her employer for failing to deliver on the employer’s promise of
retirement benefits, courts routinely dismissed the action
because the promise was unenforceable as a matter of law.4
Even after courts finally recognized that employee benefits
are not gratuities,5 but are more akin to deferred compensation,6
* Professor of Law and Thomas P. Hester Presidential Professor, the University of
Oklahoma College of Law: donbogan@ou.edu
1. See McNevin v. Solvay Process Co., 53 N.Y.S. 98, 99 (1898), aff’d, 60 N.E.
1115 (N.Y. 1901) (per curium). See generally 2 MURRAY WEBB LATIMER, INDUSTRIAL
PENSION SYSTEMS IN THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA, 681-706 (1932).
2. See Dougherty v. Salt, 125 N.E. 94 (N.Y. 1919) (Cardoza, J.) (holding that a
written executory promise to make a gift is unenforceable); Schnell v. Nell, 17 Ind.
29, 32 (Ind. 1861) (holding that a husband’s written promise to satisfy a devise made
in his late wife’s will unenforceable).
3. See Fischer v. Union Trust Co., 101 N.W. 852, 853 (Mich. 1904) (holding
that when a father gave a deed to certain real property to his daughter, along with
his oral promise to pay off a mortgage on the property, the gift of the real property
was effective with the transfer of the deed, but the promise to pay off the mortgage
could not be enforced against the father’s estate after he died without paying the
mortgage debt). See generally Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The World of Contract and the
World of Gift, 85 CAL. L. REV. 821, 822 (1997); Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott,
Enforcing Promises: An Examination of the Basis of Contract, 89 YALE L.J. 1261,
1264,1275 (1980); see generally Richard A. Posner, Gratuitous Promises in Economics
and Law, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 411, 411-426 (1977).
4. See e.g., Menke v. Thompson, 140 F.2d 786, 790 (8th Cir. 1994).
5. See LATIMER, supra note 1, at 18-19 (remarking on how employers
formalized their plans and used plans to gain tax advantages and as a tool to manage
and control their workforces). Jay Conison, Foundations of the Common Law of
Plans, 41 DEPAUL L. REV. 575, 587-588 (1992) (citing Bowler v. Nagel, 200 N.W. 258,
260 (Mich. 1924)).
6. See Inland Steel Co. v. NLRB, 170 F.2d 247, 250-53 (7th Cir. 1948) (holding
that employee benefits are a form of “wages” or “other conditions of employment”
subject to collective bargaining and expressly rejecting the employer’s argument that
employee benefits are in the nature of a gift). See generally Conison, supra note 5, at
589-618, 593-594 n. 64. See generally discussion in text accompanying notes 167-168,
infra.
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workers still frequently failed to collect anticipated benefits.
Courts strictly enforced adhesive plan contracts in an era of
laissez-faire contract interpretation.7 Additionally, prior to
ERISA’s enactment in 1974,8 neither state nor federal law
generally required plan sponsors to fund private pension plan
promises,9 or to mandate reasonable vesting rules that would
grant workers a non-forfeitable right to receive earned pension
benefits.10 Consequently, workers enrolled in unfunded or
underfunded pension plans often lost promised benefits if the
employer became insolvent,11 and workers who left their
7. See Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Butler, 86 S.W.2d 258, 262 (Tex. Civ. App.
1935) (upholding plan language allowing employer to terminate pension benefits at
will); Cowles v. Morris & Co., 300 Ill. 11, 16-24 (1928) (same). For cases applying a
similar rationale for denying claims arising from ERISA-governed welfare plans, see
Owens v. Storehouse, Inc., 984 F.2d 394, 397 (11th Cir. 1993) (quoting plan language
as follows: “The full, absolute and discretionary right is reserved in the Plan for the
Plan Sponsor to amend, modify, suspend, withdraw, discontinue or terminate the
Plan in whole or in part at any time for any and all participants of the Plan.”); see
also Hamilton v. Air Jamaica, Ltd., 945 F.2d 74, 77-78 (3d Cir. 1991) (enforcing plan
reservation of rights clause despite district court’s conclusion that the plan
disclaimer allowed plan sponsor to avoid paying promised benefits whenever it
wanted). See generally Catherine L. Fisk, Lochner Redux: The Renaissance of
Laissez-Faire Contract in the Federal Common Law of Employee Benefits, 56 OHIO
ST. L.J. 153, 169-70, 198 (1995). McGann v. H & H Music Co., 946 F.2d 401, 405 (5th
Cir. 1991), cert denied sub nom., Greenberg v. H & H Music Co., 506 U.S. 981 (1992).
8. ERISA is the common acronym for the Employee Retirement Income
Security Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829 (1974) (codified as amended at
29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1997) and in scattered sections of the Internal Revenue
Code).
A selected history of ERISA, beginning in January 1973 with the
introduction of House Bill 2, H.R. 2, 93d Cong. (1973) and Senate Bill 4, S. 4, 93d
Cong. (1973), provided the framework for the final legislation and are compiled in a
three-volume committee print. See S. COMM. ON LABOR AND PUB. WELFARE, 94TH
CONG., LEGIS. HISTORY OF THE EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT INCOME SECURITY ACT OF
1974 (1976) [hereinafter LEGISLATIVE HISTORY]. For a wonderful political history of
ERISA, reaching back well before January 1973, the date that the Committee Print
begins, see generally, JAMES A. WOOTEN, THE EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT INCOME
SECURITY ACT OF 1974: A POLITICAL HISTORY (2004) [hereinafter WOOTEN, A
POLITICAL HISTORY].
9. One exception to this general statement is for some collectively-bargained
plans. See Labor Management Relations Act of 1947 (Taft–Hartley Act) § 301, Pub.
L. 80–101, 61 Stat. 136, codified at 29 U.S.C. § 185) (mandating that Taft–Hartley
plans be funded through a trust administered jointly by management and labor
representatives).
10. See S. REP. NO. 93-383 at 3 (1973), reprinted in 1 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY,
supra note 8, at 1071 and S. REP. NO. 93-127, at 8-9 (1973) reprinted in 1
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 8, at 594-95.
11. See James A. Wooten, “The Most Glorious Story of Failure in the Business”:
The Studebaker-Packard Corporation and the Origins of ERISA, 49 BUFF. L. REV.
683, 683-84, 730 (2001) (describing the loss of expected pension benefits for
approximately 4,500 automobile workers when Studebaker-Packard collapsed and its
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employment for any reason prior to retirement age often had
earned no right to receive anticipated pension benefits.12
Further, even after recognizing that employee benefits are not
gratuities, some courts inexplicably deferred to plan sponsor
decisions to deny benefits claims, except when the worker
established that the claim denial was arbitrary or capricious.13
Congress enacted ERISA because “many . . . employees and
their beneficiaries had been deprived of anticipated benefits.”14
ERISA regulates private employee benefit plans,15 including
both pension benefit plans and welfare benefit plans.16 ERISA
pension plan was underfunded).
12. See WOOTEN, A POLITICAL HISTORY, supra note 8, at 91-97.
13. In Bruch v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 828 F.2d 134, 138-143 (3d Cir.
1987), aff’d in part and rev’d in part, 489 U.S. 101 (1989), Judge Becker traced the
history of the arbitrary and capricious standard of review in employee benefit plan
claims prior to ERISA. In particular, the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals cases cited by
Judge Becker indicate a confused Circuit Court that ultimately resolved that
employee benefits are not gifts, but create contract rights. Id. at 141-143 (citing
Kennet v. United Mineworkers of America, 183 F. Supp. 315 (D.C. Cir. 1960).
Surprisingly however, in Kennet, after District Judge Holtzoff determined that
employee benefit plan participants enjoyed legal protection under contract law to
enforce their employee benefit plan promises, he then still imposed a deferential
standard to review a plan administrator’s claim denial. See id. at 317-319.)
14. 29 U.S.C. § 1001(a) (Congressional findings and declaration of policy). See
also S. REP. NO. 93-127, at 5 (1976) (Comm. Print), reprinted in 1 LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY, at 591 (“In almost every instance, participants lose their benefits not
because of some violation of federal law, but rather because of the manner in which
the plan is executed with respect to its contractual requirements of vesting or
funding”).
15. As the name of the statute suggests, Congress enacted ERISA to reform the
private pension industry. ERISA comprehensively regulates private pension plans,
see Nachman Corp. v. Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp., 446 U.S. 359, 361-362 (1980),
at least in comparison to ERISA’s very minimal regulation of welfare benefit plans.
See Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 727, 732-33 (1985).
16. Employee benefits, commonly described as “fringe” benefits, provided or
available to workers and their family members through the worker’s employment,
are defined in ERISA as being either “pension” benefits or “welfare” benefits. A
pension plan is: “any plan, fund, or program which [is] . . . established or maintained
by an employer or by an employee organization, or by both, . . . [that] provides
retirement income to employees, or results in a deferral of income by employees. . . . ”
29 U.S.C. § 1002 (2012). A welfare benefit plan is:
any plan, fund, or program which was heretofore or is hereafter
established or maintained by an employer or by an employee
organization, or by both, . . . for the purpose of providing for its
participants or their beneficiaries, through the purchase of
insurance or otherwise, (A) medical, surgical, or hospital care or
benefits, or benefits in the event of sickness, accident, disability,
death or unemployment, or vacation benefits, apprenticeship, or
other training programs, or day care centers, scholarship funds, or
prepaid legal services, . . . .
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imposes minimum vesting standards for private pension plans,17
and it requires sponsors of private pension plans to fund the
benefit promise, usually through the establishment of a trust or
through the purchase of annuity insurance contracts.18
However, ERISA’s vesting and funding rules do not apply to
welfare plans.19 Consequently, sponsors of welfare plans can
“self-fund” their health care plans by paying covered benefits out
of operating capital on an “as-you-go basis”;20 or they can
29 U.S.C. § 1002(1) (2012).
17. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1058 (2012) (Participation and Vesting). One of
several factors that caused workers not to receive anticipated benefits prior to ERISA
was the commonplace circumstance that workers did not earn any right to receive
expected pension benefits until the workers actually retired after many years of
service to the employer (forfeiture risk). See S. REP. NO. 93-127, 93d CONG. 1ST SESS.
at 8, reprinted in 1 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 8, at 594-595. ERISA’s vesting
rules now allow workers to earn a right to receive pension benefits incrementally
after a minimum number of years of employment. Because of ERISA’s vesting rules,
pension plan sponsors remain obligated to pay such incrementally earned retirement
benefits even if the worker separates from employment prior to normal retirement
age and even if the sponsor terminates the plan. See id.
18. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 1081-1085 (2012) (Funding); see also 29 U.S.C. § 1103
(2012) (Establishment of trust). Congress recognized the problem with unfunded and
underfunded pension plans.
When sponsors paid retirement benefits out of
operating capital there was a (default) risk that workers who had earned the vested
right to receive promised pension benefits under the plan might still lose legally
entitled benefits if the sponsor suffered financial distress. By imposing funding
requirements for pension plans, and by inaugurating a pension plan termination
insurance program in Title IV of ERISA (creating the Pension Benefit Guaranty
Corporation (PBGC)), Congress created a system to secure plan sponsor pension plan
promises. In ERISA, the plan sponsor’s promise to provide employee benefits as
specified in the plan contract is essentially “collateralized” or secured through
ERISA’s mandate that the sponsor set money aside in a trust to pay earned pension
benefits or to purchase a commercial insurance product (typically annuity contracts)
to pay the benefits. The plan contract is similar to the promissory note in a secured
real estate transaction. Both the plan and promissory note define the nature and
extent of the promisor’s obligation—the promisor in an ERISA plan being the plan
sponsor. The plan trust is then akin to the real estate deed of trust that provides a
kind of collateral that allows the promisee (plan participants and their beneficiaries)
to enforce the plan contract promise if the promisor/plan sponsor otherwise fails to
pay covered benefits.
19. See 29 U.S.C. § 1051(1) (2012) (vesting rules do not apply to welfare plans);
29 U.S.C. § 1081(a)(1) (2012) (funding rules do not apply to welfare plans).
20. Self-funded plans are also often referred to as “unfunded” plans or “selfinsured” plans. Sponsors of employee health care plans often self-fund plan promises
up to a specified attachment point, and then purchase commercial stop-loss coverage
to re-insure the plan sponsor for any payments made above the attachment point.
See generally Am. Med. Sec., Inc. v. Bartlett, 111 F.3d 358, 361 (4th Cir. 1997)
(describing how plan sponsors may self-fund their employee health care plans in
order to avoid state insurance regulation and then purchase commercial stop-loss
reinsurance to protect against plan risk). See also Computer Aided Design Sys., Inc.
v. Safeco Life Ins. Co., 235 F. Supp. 2d 1052, 1053, 1062 (S.D. Iowa 2002), aff’d, 358
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establish a trust to pay promised benefits; or they can purchase
insurance to pay benefits.21
The lack of vesting and funding requirements for welfare
plans exposes ERISA welfare plan participants to many of the
same forfeiture and default risks that pension plan participants
endured prior to 1974.22 Further, confusion over the application
of trust law principles—rooted in the law of donative transfers—
to ERISA claims,23 versus the understanding that employee
benefit plans involve contract rights, still permeates plan
participant claims to recover benefits due under the terms of an
ERISA plan.24 These issues, all impacting a welfare plan
F.3d 1011 (8th Cir. 2004) (describing stop-loss contract between self-funded plan
sponsor and stop-loss reinsurer).
21. See e.g., Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 105, 115 (1989)
(involving an unfunded severance benefit plan). Collectively-bargained multiemployer plans, where liability for participating employers is generally limited to the
amounts contributed to a multi-employer plan trust, are beyond the scope of this
article.
22. See generally WOOTEN, A POLITICAL HISTORY, supra note 8, at 4-5, 9-10, 15,
25 (discussing forfeiture risk and default risk).
23. See Bruch v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 828 F.2d 134, 142-143 (3df Cir.
1987), aff’d in part and rev’d in part, 489 U.S. 101 (1989). See generally
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 1 (reciting that RESTATEMENT is not intended to
summarize the law of commercial trusts or trusts used as a security instrument).
24. Compare Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134, 146, 148
(remarking that Congress designed the remedy contained in 29 U.S.C. §
1132(a)(1)(B) “to protect contractually defined benefits . . . . ”), with Firestone Tire &
Rubber Co., 489 U.S. at 115 (applying a trust law-based standard of review in an
ERISA claim under 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B) to recover benefits due under a
severance benefits plan). Even after the Firestone Court ruled that a trust law-based
standard of review governs ERISA benefits cases, courts have further confused the
issue by equating administrative law review standards with trust law review
standards. See Mark D. DeBofsky, The Paradox of the Misuse of Administrative Law
in ERISA Benefit Claims, 37 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 727, 727-28 (2004). The question
of whether an employer’s promise to provide fringe benefits to its workers should be
governed by the law of donative transfers, or enforceable under contract law, has
been contested since the earliest employee benefits cases. In McNevin v. Solvay
Process Co., 53 N.Y.S. 98 (1898), aff’d, 60 N.E. 115 (N.Y. 1901), dissenting Judge
Green stated:
In the first place, it should be remarked that [the plan provision
reciting that] the sums to be paid are to be deemed gifts, and not
transferable, cannot alter or impair the true character of the
instrument or its legal effect and operation. A promise, founded upon
a valuable consideration inuring to the benefit of a promisor, to pay a
sum of money upon specified contingencies, is not a promise to make
a gift, even though the parties call it so.
Id. at 103 (Green, J., dissenting). See also McLemore v. Western Union Tel. Co., 171
P. 390, 394 (1918) (enforcing participant’s contractual right to benefits, despite
reservation of rights language in plan which gave the administrative committee
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participant’s ability to enforce his or her reasonable expectations
to receive plan benefits,25 coalesce in a series of cases which hold
that the only proper party defendant in an ERISA benefits claim
is the plan itself.26
Those cases should prompt further
reflection—what is a plan? What is the legal relationship
between the plan, the plan sponsor, the plan administrator, the
plan trustee (if any), and the plan participant? And how did
Congress expect a participant to enforce a sponsor’s welfare
benefit plan promise, particularly under an unfunded plan?
ERISA contains a civil enforcement provision27 that, among
other claims, grants workers and their covered family members
the right to sue in federal court to recover promised benefits—
pension and welfare benefits—due under the terms of an
employee benefit plan.28 The Supreme Court has consistently
ruled that a plan is a contract, and that an action under ERISA
§ 502(a)(1)(B) seeks to recover “contractually defined benefits.”29
Given that express remedy to pursue money damages for breach
of the plan contract, it is rather startling that any federal court
would have ruled that the proper party defendant in a plan
participant’s action to recover benefits due under the terms of
his or her plan is the plan, and only the plan.30 This outcome is
all the more remarkable because Congress did not say that a
appointed by Board of Directors complete discretion and control over claims against
the plan).
25. For pension plan participants, ERISA’s mandatory funding rules, supported
by ERISA’s pension plan termination insurance program, generally provide a
reasonable level of protection against the default risk that plagued participants prior
to ERISA; however, both welfare and pension plan participants continue to suffer
under the court-invented, nominally trust law-based deferential review standard
applied in ERISA benefit claims. See generally Donald T. Bogan, ERISA: The
Foundational Insufficiencies for Deferential Review in Employee Benefit Claims—
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Glenn, 27 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 147 (2009). See
infra note 86, at 406-407 (cases holding that the plan, and only the plan, is a proper
party defendant in an ERISA § 502(a)(1)(B) benefits claim). See generally JEFFREY
LEWIS ET AL., EMPLOYEE BENEFITS LAW (3d. ed. 2012) (hereinafter EMPLOYEE
BENEFITS LAW), at ch. 13, IV (Judicial Review).
26. See discussion in text accompanying notes 86-96, infra.
27. 29 U.S.C. § 1132.
28. See § 1132(a)(1)(B) (allowing participants to sue in state court or federal
court, though defendants typically remove state court-filed ERISA claims under
federal question removal jurisdiction).
29. See Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134, 146-48 (1985)
(remarking that Congress designed the remedy contained in 29 U.S.C. §
1132(a)(1)(B) “to protect contractually defined benefits ”).
See discussion
accompanying notes 111-118, infra.
30. See discussion in text accompanying notes 56-76, infra, and cases cited
therein.
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plan shall be the only party defendant in an ERISA benefits
claim.31 Further, the holding requires a promisee to sue the plan
contract itself, and does not permit suit against the promisor
who made the contract—and the plan contract, as such, is not a
legal or “juristic” person with capacity to own property or assets
that a sheriff can sell to enforce a judgment against the plan.32
This article explores the evolution of ERISA case law as
courts have slowly recognized that ERISA’s civil enforcement
provision does not expressly limit the universe of legal persons
that may be proper party defendants in an ERISA benefits
claim. That examination of case law reveals a surprisingly
indifferent reading of ERISA in one line of federal court ERISA
cases, and perhaps even some hostility to lawsuits that
previously had been routinely handled in state court.33 Then,
even as courts in a second line of cases rejected requests to limit
the field of defendants that plaintiffs could sue in a benefits
claim to just the plan, these courts have largely applied an
incorrect legal paradigm that can still shield the promisor under
the plan contract from direct liability. Unfortunately, the
second, better line of cases that generally allow participants to
sue whoever “controls” the claims decision,34 still reflect a
misreading of ERISA, a misconception of what is a plan, and a
misunderstanding of the relationship among the ERISA parties
and the plan contract. If a plan is a contract, and a §
502(a)(1)(B) claim to recover benefits due under a plan is
governed by ordinary principles of contract law,35 then contract
law processes should dictate what party may be liable for breach
31. See discussion accompanying notes 77-80, infra.
32. See Curcio v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 33 F.3d 226, 239-240 (3d Cir.
1994) (McKelvie, J., dissenting) (remarking that the plan owns no assets except the
insurance contract purchased by the plan sponsor to fund the benefit plan). See
discussion accompanying notes 72-74, infra.
33. See Judicial Conference of the United States, LONG RANGE PLAN FOR THE
FEDERAL COURTS , 166 F.R.D. 49, 96 (Dec. 1995) (Rehnquist, C.J.) (“ERISA allows
participants and beneficiaries of employee welfare (e.g., health insurance and
severance pay) plans to bring actions in either federal or state court to recover
benefits due under the terms of the plan and to enforce or clarify plan terms.
Resolution of those cases turn, not on the specific substantive provisions of ERISA or
its underlying regulations, but on contract and trust law principles embodied in a
‘federal common law’ developed from state legislation and common law. Under a
system of judicial federalism, the federal courts should not be involved in the
adjudication of disputes that do not require their particular expertise because they
essentially involve application of state law.”).
34. See discussion in text accompanying notes 98-102, infra.
35. See M & G Polymers USA, LLC v. Tackett, 135 S. Ct. 926, 933 (January 26,
2015).
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of the benefit plan. Finally, in 2013, the Seventh Circuit Court
of Appeals applied contract law principles to hold that a plan
insurer responsible to pay approved claims as an obligor under
the insurance plan is a proper party defendant in an ERISA §
502(a)(1)(B) claim for benefits.36 The next step is to apply that
contract law foundation to hold that employer/plan sponsors are
the obligors under non-insured plan contracts, with all that
entails.
II.

ERISA’S PLAIN LANGUAGE INDICATES THAT
CONGRESS DID NOT INTEND TO LIMIT THE
UNIVERSE OF POSSIBLE DEFENDANTS IN AN
ERISA § 502(A)(1)(B) CLAIM TO RECOVER
BENEFITS DUE UNDER THE TERMS OF A
PLAN

A. ERISA § 502
ERISA’s civil enforcement provision, detailed in § 502 of the
statute,37 specifies who—which “persons” as defined in the
statute—have standing to sue, and also describes the claims for
relief available to those persons under ERISA.38
Plan
participants39 and beneficiaries40 can sue under ERISA §
502(a)(1)(B) to recover benefits due under the terms of a plan, or
to enforce rights, or to clarify rights to future benefits under the

36. See Larson v. United Healthcare Ins. Co., 723 F.3d 905, 911-916 (7th Cir.
2013). See also discussion in text accompanying notes 112-117, infra.
37. 29 U.S.C. § 1132 (2012). See infra, note 46 (reprinting ERISA § 502 as
initially enacted in 1974).
38. 29 U.S.C. § 1002(9) (2012) (defining the term “person” to mean “an
individual, partnership, joint venture, corporation, mutual company, joint-stock
company, trust, estate, unincorporated organization, association, or employee
organization.”). The term “employee organization” is further defined in 29 U.S.C. §
1002(4). Notably, a plan entity is not identified as a person or party that can pursue
a claim for relief in any of the subparts of ERISA § 502 that specify particular claims
available under ERISA and who can be a plaintiff under such subparts. Further, the
plan is not identified as a party or person that can be sued in any of the subparts of §
502 that specifically limit who can be sued under those subparts. See 29 U.S.C. §§
1132(a). See also discussion in text accompanying notes 47-50, infra.
39. 29 U.S.C. § 1002(7) (describing a “participant” as an “employee or former
employee . . . who is or may become eligible to receive a benefit” from an employee
pension or welfare plan).
40. 29 U.S.C. § 1002(8) (describing a “beneficiary” as “a person designated by a
participant . . . who is or may become entitled” to receive an employee pension or
welfare plan benefit through the participant.).
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terms of a plan.41 Section 502(a)(2) allows a participant or
beneficiary or the Secretary of the Department of Labor42 to
recover “appropriate relief” in a claim arising from a breach of
fiduciary duty as referenced in ERISA § 409.43 And participants,
beneficiaries, or a “fiduciary”44 may sue under § 502(a)(3)45 to
enjoin any violation of ERISA or the terms of a plan, or to obtain
“other appropriate equitable relief” to redress such violations or
to enforce any provision of ERISA or the terms of a plan.46
41. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B). See supra, note 16 (defining what is a “plan”).
42. See 29 U.S.C. § 1002(13).
43. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(2) (cross-referencing 29 U.S.C. § 1109 (2012)). 29 U.S.C.
§ 1009 allows suit only against a person who is a fiduciary and instructs that any
recovery obtained in a § 1132(a)(2) suit to enforce § 1109 shall be applied to “make
good to [the] plan any losses to the plan resulting from each such [fiduciary] breach”).
See Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134, 140 (1985).
44. 29 U.S.C. § 1002(14)(A) (2012) (describing a “party in interest”). See
Firestone Tire and Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 113 (1989).
45. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3).
46. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a), as enacted in 1974, provides as follows:
(a) Persons empowered to bring a civil action
A civil action may be brought––
(1) by a participant or beneficiary––
(A) for the relief provided in subsection (c) of this section [concerning
requests to the administrator for information], or
(B) to recover benefits due to him under the terms of his plan, to
enforce his rights under the terms of the plan, or to clarify his rights
to future benefits under the terms of the plan;
(2) by the Secretary, or by a participant, beneficiary or fiduciary for
appropriate relief under section 1109 [breach of fiduciary duty];
(3) by a participant, beneficiary, or fiduciary (A) to enjoin any act or
practice which violates any provision of this title or the terms of the
plan, or (B) to obtain other appropriate equitable relief (i) to redress
such violations or (ii) to enforce any provisions of this subchapter or
the terms of the plan;
(4) by the Secretary, or by a participant, or beneficiary for
appropriate relief in the case of a violation of 1025(c) [information to
be furnished to participants];
(5) except as otherwise provided in subsection (b), by the Secretary
(A) to enjoin any act or practice which violates any provision of this
subchapter, or (B) to obtain other appropriate equitable relief (i) to
redress such violation or (ii) to enforce any provision of this
subchapter;
(6) by the Secretary to collect any civil penalty under paragraph (2),
(4), (5), (6), (7), (8), or (9) of subsection (c) of this section or under
subsection (i) or (l)..
29 U.S.C. § 1132 (a) (as enacted) (several additional subparagraphs have been added
to § 1132(a) [§ 502(a)] since 1974.)
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In several subparts of § 502, the statute identifies who can
be held responsible in a claim under those specific subparts,47
but most subparts of § 502 do not expressly limit who can be
sued for a violation of the subpart. Notably, § 502(a)(1)(B) does
not say anything about who can be sued or named as a party
defendant in a participant’s claim to recover money damages
allegedly due under the terms of an ERISA-governed pension or
welfare benefit plan.48 Similarly, ERISA § 502(a)(3), which
details a “catchall” remedy for appropriate equitable relief,49
does not expressly limit the universe of possible defendants that
can be held accountable under that subpart.50
Congress included some puzzling language in ERISA §
502(d) that courts in one line of “proper party defendant” cases
have interpreted to impose a limitation on who may be sued in
claims filed under § 502(a)(1)(B).51 Section 502(d)(1) states that
a plan “may sue or be sued . . . as an entity” and that service of
process “upon a trustee or an administrator of an employee
benefit plan in his capacity as such shall constitute service” upon
the plan.52 Additionally, § 502(d)(2) declares that “Any money
judgment [obtained] against an employee benefit plan shall be
enforceable only against the plan as an entity and shall not be
enforceable against any other person unless liability against
such person is established in his individual capacity . . . .”53
ERISA § 502(d) presents two obvious questions: (1) What
did Congress intend to achieve with its declaration that a plan,
which is not otherwise a legal person, can sue and be sued as an
47. See 29 U.S.C. § 1132(c)(1) (administrator); 29 U.S.C. § 1132(c)(2) (plan
administrator); 29 U.S.C. § 1132(c)(3) (any employer); 29 U.S.C. § 1132(c)(4) (“for
each violation by any person of subsection (j), (k), or (l) of section 1021 of this title or
section 1144(e)(3) of this title.”); 29 U.S.C. § 1132(c)(5) (any person); 29 U.S.C. §
1132(c)(6) (plan administrator); 29 U.S.C. § 1132(c)(7) (plan administrator); 29
U.S.C. § 1132(i) (party in interest); 29 U.S.C. § 1132(l) (fiduciary or other person);
and 29 U.S.C. § 1132(m) (plan fiduciary).
48. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B). The United States Supreme Court suggests that
ERISA § 502 provides the exclusive remedies for all claims falling within the scope of
that provision. See Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58, 62-66 (1987)
(extending complete preemption doctrine to ERISA); but see Franchise Tax Bd. of
Cal. v. Constr. Laborers Vacation Trust for Southern Cal., 463 U.S. 1, 25-26 (1983)
(refusing to apply complete preemption doctrine to ERISA and relying upon ERISA’s
saving clause, ERISA § 502(b)(2)(A), 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(A), to suggest that ERISA
does not entirely preempt state insurance law remedies).
49. See Varity Corp. v. Howe, 516 U.S. 489, 512 (1996).
50. See discussion in text accompanying notes 82-84, infra.
51. See infra note 57-67, at 401. See also 29 U.S.C. § 1132(d)(1).
52. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(d)(1).
53. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(d)(2) (emphasis added).
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“entity”;54 and, (2) How does the “unless” clause in ERISA §
502(d)(2) modify the directive that a money judgment obtained
against the plan as an entity shall not be enforceable against
any other person?55
B. THE SILLY CASES ONLY PERMIT SUIT AGAINST THE
PLAN AS AN ENTITY
In a 1985 opinion, Gelardi v. Pertec Computer Corp.,56 the
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the only proper party
defendant in a § 502(a)(1)(B) claim is the plan.
The
employer/plan sponsor, Pertec Computer Corp. (Pertec), selffunded the plan and hired Self-Insurance Programs (Self), a
separate corporation, to serve as plan administrator. However,
Self delegated final review authority back to a group of Pertec
employees, designated the Pertec Employee Benefits Committee
(the Committee). Self initially denied plan participant Joyce
Gelardi’s disability benefits claim and then (on internal appeal)
the Committee confirmed the claim denial.
Ms. Gelardi sued her employer, Pertec, and Self, the named
plan administrator, presenting two ERISA claims: first, a §
502(a)(1)(B) claim to recover benefits due under the terms of the
Pertec employee benefit plan; and second, a claim for breach of
fiduciary duty under § 409 (actionable pursuant to § 502(a)(2)).
Both defendants sought to escape responsibility for the
Committee’s final claim denial, urging that they were not proper
party defendants under § 502(a)(1)(B) or under § 502(a)(2).
Relying solely on a cite to § 502(d), the Ninth Circuit
Gelardi opinion declared that the plan “entity” is the only proper
party defendant in a § 502(a)(1)(B) claim for benefits.57
Surprisingly, there is no discussion in the opinion exploring the
language of § 502(d)(1), no recognition that § 502(a)(1)(B) does
not expressly limit who can be a defendant in a claim under that
subpart,58 no mention that the “unless” clause in § 502(d)(2)
54. Gelardi v. Pertec Computer Corp., 761 F.2d 1323, 1324 (9th Cir. 1985) (per
curium).
55. Id.
56. Id., overruled by Cyr v. Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co., 642 F.3d 1202
(2011) (en banc).
57. Gelardi, 761 F.2d at 1324-1325.
58. See Larson v. United Healthcare Ins. Co., 723 F.3d 905, 913 (7th Cir. 2013);
Lifecare Mgmt. Servs. v. Insurance Mgmt. Adm’rs, 703 F.3d 835, 843 (5th Cir. 2013);
Cyr v. Reliance Std. Life Ins. Co., 642 F.3d 1202, 1206 (9th Cir 2011); Leister v.
Dovetail, Inc., 546 F.3d 875, 879 (7th Cir. 2008).
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expressly contemplates that parties other than the plan can be
sued under ERISA,59 and no discussion of what Congress meant
when it declared a plan to be an “entity”.60 The Ninth Circuit
upheld the district court summary judgment in favor of Pertec
and Self on the § 502(a)(1)(B) claim, declaring it “self-evident”
that neither the employer nor the plan administrator is the plan
itself.61
ERISA § 502(d)(1) declares that a plan can sue and be sued
as an entity.62 However, § 502(d)(2) recites that a judgment
against a plan is enforceable only against the plan entity
“unless” liability is established against some other person in that
other person’s individual capacity.63 A logical reading of ERISA
§ 502(d) refutes, rather than supports the Gelardi rationale.
Setting aside for the moment the questions of what an “entity” is
and what Congress intended to achieve by declaring a contract
between private parties to be an entity,64 the “unless” clause in §
502(d)(2) necessarily contemplates that other non-plan parties
may be sued and held accountable under ERISA’s civil
enforcement provision.65

59. See Larson, 723 F.3d at 914 (quoting Cyr, 642 F.3d at 1207).
60. There is no description of the term “entity” in ERISA’s definitions section.
See 29 U.S.C § 1002 (2012) (Definitions).
61. See Gelardi, 761 F.2d at 1324-1325.
62. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(d) (status of employee benefit plan as entity) recites as
follows:
(1) An employee benefit plan may sue or be sued under this
subchapter as an entity. Service of summons, subpoena, or other
legal process of a court upon a trustee or an administrator of an
employee benefit plan in his capacity as such shall constitute service
upon the employee benefit plan. . . .
(2) Any money judgment under this subchapter against an employee
benefit plan shall be enforceable only against the plan as an entity
and shall not be enforceable against any other person unless liability
against such person is established in his individual capacity under
this subchapter.
63. Id.
64. See discussion accompanying notes 169-188, infra.
65. See Leister v. Dovetail, Inc., 546 F.3d 875, 879 (7th Cir. 2008) (stating that
“[t]he first clause [of § 502(d)] just allows plans to sue or be sued, and the second
clause just specifies consequences if the plan is sued; neither seems to be limiting the
class of defendants who may be sued[.]”); Bernstein v. Citigroup, Inc., No.
3:06CV209M, 2006 WL 2329385, at *3-7, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 54712 (N.D. Tex.
July 5, 2006) (citing Harris Trust and Sav. Bank v. Salomon Smith Barney Inc., 530
U.S. 238 (2000)). See also Larson v. United Healthcare Ins. Co., 723 F.3d 905, 914
(7th Cir. 2013) (quoting Cyr v. Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co., 642 F.3d 1202, 1207
(9th Cir. 2011) (en banc)).
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Following the Gelardi court’s perfunctory cite to ERISA §
502(d), the court then examined the breach of fiduciary duty
claim and found that because the employer had appointed Self
as plan administrator, and Self had delegated final claims
decision authority to the Committee, neither Pertec nor Self
could be liable as a fiduciary in Ms. Gelardi’s § 502(a)(2) claim.66
The Ninth Circuit found that although the Committee both was
made up of Pertec employees and owed Gelardi a fiduciary duty
in determining claims, “this [did] not make the employer a
fiduciary with respect to the Committee’s acts.”67 Somehow,
writing this sentence into the opinion did not cause anyone on
the Ninth Circuit panel to ask whether the Committee,
admittedly made up of Pertec employees and appointed by the
Pertec Board of Directors, had any separate legal person
existence. Nor did the panel consider whether the individual
Committee members were acting on behalf of the corporate
employer in exercising their fiduciary duties, or whether they
might be serving as agents for Pertec, the promisor on the plan
contract that the Committee was administering for Pertec. If
the Committee (of Pertec employees) was acting on behalf of
Pertec, presumably Pertec would have been legally responsible
for the Committee’s actions and exposed to respondeat superior
liability if the Committee members committed a breach of
fiduciary duty.
ERISA requires plan sponsors to appoint an administrator
to manage their employee benefit plan promises. The sponsor
has sole power to select the administrator and may appoint itself
or one or more of its employees to serve as plan administrator. If
the sponsor fails to designate a plan administrator, ERISA
details that the sponsor shall be the administrator.68
Corporations act thought their employees and agents.69
Congress did not declare or imply that ERISA is exempt from
historic agency law principles; however, without explanation,
federal courts typically ignore agency law when they apply
ERISA’s civil enforcement scheme and determine what persons
or parties may be liable under ERISA’s breach of contract

66. See Gelardi, 761 F.2d at 1324-1325.
67. Id. (remarking “[The fact] [t]hat the Plan Administrator serves at the
pleasure of the [Pertec] Board of Directors makes Pertec and the Board fiduciaries
and liable as such only with respect to the selection of the Administrator.”).
68. See 29 U.S.C. §1002(A)(ii) (2012).
69. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY §§ 1.01, 2.02, 6.01 (2006).
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remedy.70 To the extent that the Committee of Pertec employees
served as the plan administrator and that a plan administrator
can be held liable under § 502(a)(1)(B), the Committee, or more
appropriately, the individual members of the Committee
appointed by Pertec to administer the Pertec employee benefit
plan were Pertec’s agents, acting within the scope of their
agency. Consequently, Pertec, the principal for such agents,
should not have been dismissed from Ms. Gelardi’s lawsuit.71
Without any inquiry into the rationale of the Gelardi
opinion, an astonishing number of other courts have relied upon
the one-sentence statement––that “ERISA permits suits to
recover benefits only against the Plan as an entity”72––to
abruptly dismiss parties, including employer/plan sponsors, plan
insurers, and plan administrators, in participant benefit
claims.73 It is particularly troubling that courts have been so
70. See, e.g., UNUM Life Ins. Co. of Am. v. Ward, 526 U.S. 358, 377-379 (1999)
(overruling the Ninth Circuit’s application of general principles of agency law in
ERISA benefits claim because ERISA preempts state law but failing to address
whether a federal common law of agency should be developed and applied in ERISA
claims).
71. Presumably, each individual Committee member could be sued in the §
502(a)(3) claim for breach of fiduciary duty under the Gelardi holding, but the
individual Committee members were not obligors on the plan contract—the
Committee members did not promise to provide benefits to the Pertec workers, the
employer made that promise and should be held accountable under § 502(a)(1)(B) as
the obligor on the plan contract.
72. Gelardi, 761 F.2d at 1324.
73. See Jass v. Prudential Health Care Plan, Inc., 88 F.3d 1482, 1490 (7th
Cir.1996); Spain v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 11 F.3d 129 (9th Cir. 1993); Lee v. Burkhart,
991 F.2d 1004, 1009 (2d Cir. 1993); Gibson v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 915 F.2d
414, 417 (9th Cir. 1990); Madden v. ITT Long Term Disability Plan for Salaried
Emp., 914 F.2d 1279, 1287 (9th Cir. 1990); Crawford v. Exxon Corp., 851 F. Supp.
242, 244 n. 16 (M.D. La. 1994); Holland v. Bank of Am., 673 F. Supp. 1511, 1518
(S.D. Cal. 1987); Holloway v. HECI Exploration Co. Emps. Profit Sharing Plan, 76
B.R. 563, 570 (N.D. Tex. 1987), aff'd, 862 F.2d 513 (5th Cir. 1988). See also
Blickenstaff v. R.R. Donnelley & Sons Co. Short Term Disability Plan, 378 F.3d 669,
674 (7th Cir. 2004) (quoting Neuma, Inc. v. AMP, Inc., 259 F.3d 864, 872 n. 4 (7th
Cir. 2001) (quoting Jass, 88 F.3d at 1490)); Riordan v. Commonwealth Edison Co.,
128 F.3d 549, 551 (7th Cir. 1997) (“It is true that ERISA permits suits to recover
benefits only against the plan as an entity[.]” (citing Jass, 88 F.3d at 1490)); Roig v.
Ltd. Long Term Disability Program, No. 99-2460, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11379, at *9
(E.D. La. Aug. 4, 2000) (following Gelardi but also citing contrary authority); Murphy
v. Wal–Mart Assocs.' Group Health Plan, 928 F. Supp. 700, 709-710 (E.D. Tex. 1996)
(failing to cite Gelardi but reaching result that only the plan could be sued under §
502(a)(1)(B)); Chilcote v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield United of Wis., 841 F. Supp. 877,
880 (E.D. Wis. 1993) (failing to cite Gelardi but remarking that “It is clear under the
law that the employer is not a ‘party’ to a plan for purposes of suit, and that only the
plan as an entity may be sued for benefits due under a plan.”); Miller v. Pension Plan
for Emp. of Coastal Corp., 780 F. Supp. 768, 773 (D. Kan. 1991) (dismissing plan
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cavalier in dismissing the party defendant that represents the
“money” in employee benefit plan claims—the party responsible
to pay the claim if the worker, in fact, prevails in a § 502(a)(1)(B)
lawsuit.74 If a court dismisses the promisor in a breach of
contract lawsuit, plus the parties controlling the collateral
intended to secure the promisor’s contractual obligations (the
trustee in a plan funded through a trust, or the insurer in a fully
insured plan),75 how can a plan participant who wins a money
judgment under § 502(a)(1)(B) collect that judgment against a
plan “entity” that is not a legal person and owns no assets, or
against a plan administrator that may also be judgment proof
and lacking legal person status?76 Did Congress really intend
sponsor without objection from plaintiff because plan sponsor is not a proper party
defendant in a § 502(a)(1)(B) claim which only allows claims versus the plan as an
entity).
74. See, e.g., Everhart v. Allmerica Fin. Life Ins. Co., 277 F.3d 751 (9th Cir.
2001) (dismissing plan insurer because only the plan or plan administrator are
proper party defendants in § 502(a)(1)(B) claim), overruled by Cyr v. Reliance
Standard Life Ins. Co., 642 F.3d 1202, 1207 (9th Cir. 2011) (en banc); Crocco v. Xerox
Corp., 137 F.3d 105, 107 (2d Cir. 1998) (holding that self-funded plan sponsor could
not be liable in a § 502(a)(1)(B) benefit claim even if employer controlled the claims
decision). But see Pecor v. Northwestern Nat'l Ins. Co., 869 F. Supp. 651, 653 (E.D.
Wis. 1994) (refusing to dismiss plan insurer and suggesting that a judgment against
the plan created joint and several liability so that plan insurer could be held
responsible to pay judgment entered against plan).
75. See Everhart at 759 (9th Cir. 2001) (Reinhardt, J., dissenting) (“I would hold
that an ERISA beneficiary may sue a third-party insurer who is legally responsible,
by contract, for the payment of ERISA benefits[]”), overruled by Cyr v. Reliance
Standard Life Ins. Co., 642 F.3d 1202, 1207 (9th Cir. 2011) (en banc).
76. See Cyr v. Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co., 642 F.3d 1202 (9th Cir. 2011)(en
banc), Amicus curiae brief for the Secretary of the United States Department of
Labor, available at 2008 WL 6659350, at pg. 11-13.
[I]f a participant in such a suit is found to be entitled to benefits
under a plan that is funded solely through an insurance policy, it is
not clear how that participant can obtain those benefits in the
absence of the insurer. Even if the participant or the plan or plan
administrator is entitled to bring a second suit to enforce rights as a
matter of state contract or insurance law, which is not at all clear
given ERISA’s broad preemption provision, the ruling in the first
ERISA action would not necessarily be binding as a matter of res
judicata or collateral estoppel on the insurer since it was not and
could not, in [the Ninth] Circuit, be part of the first adjudication.
Accordingly, there is a real potential for inconsistent rulings, i.e., the
plan being found liable for the benefits in an ERISA suit, but the
insurer being found not liable, with the result being that either the
plan or the plan sponsor is forced to pay for benefits that were
thought to be insured, or the ERISA participants or beneficiaries are
simply not able to get the benefits to which they are entitled. Such a
result is flatly inconsistent with ERISA’s goal to provide ‘a panoply
of remedial devices’ for participants and beneficiaries of benefit
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that the ERISA plan sponsor’s promise to pay employee benefits
would be a “non-recourse” promise, like the promise to make a
gift was a non-recourse promise in the early days of employee
benefits law—that is, a promise that could not be enforced? The
Gelardi opinion appears to be so clearly wrong that one has to
question the attentiveness of that court and the other courts that
have relied upon Gelardi to dismiss obligor defendants in a
breach of contract action, without even exploring the statutory
language.
A plain reading of § 502(a) suggests that Congress did not
intend to place any limit, not otherwise dictated by laws of
general applicability,77 on who could be pursued as a defendant
in a § 502(a)(1)(B) claim to recover benefits due under the terms
of a plan. Congress carefully thought about what parties could
present claims as plaintiffs under ERISA’s civil enforcement
provision, as demonstrated by the meticulous attention to that
detail in § 502(a).78 Additionally, Congress obviously knew how
to limit an ERISA claim to only certain possible party
defendants, since Congress chose to do exactly that in other
subparts of ERISA § 502, including §§ 502(c), 502(i), 502(k),
502(l) and 502(m).79 Congress’s decision not to place any express
limit on who could be a party defendant in a § 502(a)(1)(B) action
to recover benefits due under the terms of a plan appears to
establish that Congress did not intend any such limitation.80
In Harris Trust & Savings Bank v. Salomon Smith Barney
81
Inc., the Supreme Court examined the assertion that only the
plan could be named as a defendant in a claim for appropriate
equitable relief under ERISA § 502(a)(3). Like § 502(a)(1)(B), §
502(a)(3) does not expressly limit the universe of defendants that
can be pursued under that subpart of § 502. In Harris Trust, the
Supreme Court observed that Congress was very careful in
identifying who could be a plaintiff under the various subparts of
§ 502,82 and also that other subparts of section 502, in contrast

plans. (internal citations omitted).
77. See Larson v. United Healthcare Ins. Co., 723 F.3d 905, 915 (7th Cir. 2013)
(remarking that plaintiff must have a valid legal theory to proceed against non-plan
defendant).
78. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a) (2012). See Harris Trust & Sav. Bank v. Salomon Smith
Barney, Inc., 530 U.S. 238, 246-47 (2000).
79. See supra, note 48.
80. See Cyr, 642 F.3d at 1205-1206.
81. Harris Trust, 530 U.S. at 241-243, 253-254.
82. Id. at 246-247.
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to § 502(a)(3), do expressly address who may be a defendant.83
Based upon its plain meaning reading of the section, including
those observations, the Harris Trust Court held that § 502(a)(3)
proscribes no limit on the universe of possible defendants that
could be pursued under that subpart.84 The same observations
the Harris Trust Court made regarding § 502(a)(3) apply equally
to § 502(a)(1)(B) and compel the same outcome.
Despite the seemingly unassailable logic that the Harris
Trust § 502(a)(3) holding should govern the identical controlling
circumstances in claims under § 502(a)(1)(B),85 a number of
courts continued to apply the Gelardi holding even after Harris
Trust.86 One such opinion, finally overruled in 2011, is the
Ninth Circuit opinion in Everhart v. Allmerica Financial Life
Insurance Co.87 In Everhart, the plan beneficiary’s husband,
83. Id. at 246.
84. Id. at 246-248. Interestingly, the Supreme Court did not discuss or cite to
ERISA § 502(d) in the Harris Trust opinion.
85. See Larson v. United Healthcare Ins. Co., 723 F.3d 905, 913 (7th Cir. 2013);
Lifecare Mgmt. Serv. v. Insurance Mgmt. Adm’rs, 703 F.3d 835, 843, n. 8 (5th Cir.
2013); Cyr v. Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co., 642 F.3d 1202, 1205-1206 (9th Cir.
2011) (en banc).
86. See, e.g., Mote v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 502 F.3d 601, 610-611 (7th Cir. 2007)
(dismissing plan administrator from suit and holding that only plan could be sued in
participant’s claim for benefits absent exceptional circumstances without citing
Harris Trust); Blickenstaff v. R.R. Donnelley & Sons Co. Short Term Disability Plan,
378 F.3d 669, 674, n. 1 (7th Cir. 2004) (holding that the plan is the only proper party
defendant in a § 502(a)(1)(B) claim without citing Harris Trust and upholding
dismissal of Donnelley & Sons, the employer/plan sponsor/plan administrator of a
self-funded disability benefits plan and Hartford, the “claims evaluator” with
discretion and final authority to make claims decisions who court described as being
an agent for the plan); Everhart v. Allmerica Financial Life Ins. Co., 275 F.3d 751,
753-754 (9th Cir. 2001) ( distinguishing Harris Trust without discussion); Moody v.
Liberty Life Assurance Co., No. C07-01017(MHP), 2007 WL 1174828 (N.D. Cal. Jan.
26, 2009) (refusing to apply Harris Trust precedent to a § 502(a)(1)(B) claim in
reliance on Everhart). Cf. Ford v. MCI Commc’ns Corp. Health and Welfare Plan, 399
F.3d 1076, 1081-1083 (9th Cir. 2005) (ruling in a disability benefits case where plan
was unfunded and employer/plan sponsor/plan administrator (MCI) was in
bankruptcy and Hartford served as “claims administrator” with discretionary powers
and final authority to determine claims participant sued under ERISA §§
502(a)(1)(B), 502(a)(2), and 502(a)(3) that the plan is the only proper party defendant
in a § 502(a)(1)(B) claim citing Gelardi but also stating that a named plan
administrator could be sued under § 502(a)(1)(B) and dismissing claim versus
Hartford because it was not the named plan administrator all without discussing or
citing Harris Trust); Harrison v. PNC Fin. Serv. Group, 928 F. Supp. 2d 934, 943 n. 4
(S.D. Ohio 2013) (refusing to dismiss employer where participant sued to recover
benefits due under § 502(a)(1)(B) and for attorney’s fees because employer controlled
claims decision and could be liable for attorney’s fees, but refusing to apply Harris
Trust rationale).
87. 277 F.3d 751 (9th Cir. 2001), overruled by Cyr v. Reliance Standard Life Ins.

16.2 BOGAN_MACRO_FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2015]

THE SILLINESS OF ERISA

10/1/15 10:29 AM

413

who was a member of his employer’s group life insurance plan,
died in a plane crash. The employer/plan sponsor, Credence
Systems Corp. (Credence), also served as plan administrator.
Credence funded the plan through the purchase of a group
insurance policy from defendant Allmerica Financial Life
Insurance Co. (Allmerica).88 The beneficiary released Credence
from all claims in settling an unrelated matter, but preserved
her right to pursue Allmerica for the life insurance benefits.89
The Allmerica policy promised to pay a death benefit of two
times the deceased participant’s annual earnings. The dispute
arose because, while the worker earned an annual salary of
$84,800, he also earned additional non-salary annual income of
$154,987. The insurer agreed to pay twice the annual salary,
but refused to count the additional earnings as part of the
benefits calculation. The beneficiary sued Allmericaunder §
502(a)(1)(B) to recover two times her deceased husband’s entire
annual earnings under the terms of the plan. The district court
ruled that since Allmerica was not the plan or the plan sponsor,
it was not a proper party defendant, even though the insurer
was legally responsible to pay any approved benefits under the
group insurance contract.90
The Everhart court upheld the dismissal of the plan insurer
under the Gelardi line of cases, even after discussing a second
line of cases within the same circuit91 and from other circuits
that reject the narrow Gelardi rationale,92 and even after citing
Co., 642 F.3d 1202, 1207 (9th Cir. 2011) (en banc). See Powell v. Eustis Eng’g Co.,
No. 02-1259, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20046, at *1-12, *4 (E.D. La. Nov. 6, 2003).
88. Everhart, 275 F.3d at 752-53.
89. See id.
90. See id.
91. See id. at 754 (citing Taft v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc’y, 9 F.3d 1469,
1471 (9th Cir. 1993) (allowing suit versus plan administrator under ERISA §
502(a)(2))). See also Ford v. MCI Commc’ns Corp. Health and Welfare Plan, 399 F.3d
1076, 1081-1082 (9th Cir. 2005) (upholding dismissal of suit against ITT Hartford
Insurance/Hartford Life which received delegated power to determine claims because
Hartford was not the named plan administrator); Moody v. Liberty Life Assurance
Co., No. C07-01017(MHP), 2007 WL 1174828, at *4, n. 5, n. 6 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 26,
2009) (citing Everhart and Taft for holding that either the plan or the plan
administrator may be sued in Ninth Circuit under § 502(a)(1)(B)); Lee v. Prudential
Ins. Co. of Am., 673 F. Supp. 998, 1003 (N.D. Cal. 1987) (suggesting that Gelardi
ruling that only plan could be sued in a § 502(a)(1)(B) claim was dicta and holding
that plan administrator could be sued in addition to the plan entity). But see
Yacobucci v. Sun Life Assurance Co., No. C98–4600(VRW), 1999 WL 300647, at *1
(N.D. Cal. May 10, 1999) (stating that district court ruling in Lee had been abrogated
by further Ninth Circuit cases following Gelardi).
92. See Everhart, 275 F.3d at 754 (citing Layes v. Mead Corp., 132 F.3d 1246,
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Harris Trust.93 The Everhart panel majority dismissed the
precedential value of Harris Trust with the terse statement that
Ms. Everhart did not bring suit under § 502(a)(3), rather “[s]he
brought this action against Allmerica solely under §
502(a)(1)(B).”94
Given the similarity of the proper party
defendant question, whether applied to § 502(a)(3) or §
502(a)(1)(B) claims, and the persuasive rationale of the Harris
Trust opinion, which applies with absolutely the same strength
to (a)(1)(B) claims as it does to (a)(3) claims, the Everhart court’s
failure to discuss Harris Trust smacks of judicial negligence.
And Judge Reinhardt essentially said so in his dissenting
opinion. Judge Reinhardt wrote that:
The majority . . . can point to no provision of ERISA
either limiting the parties that may be sued under the
statute to ERISA plans and administrators, or
prohibiting suits against third-party insurers.
Therefore, applying the reasoning of the Supreme
Court in Harris Trust and Savings Bank v. Salomon
Smith Barney, there is “no limit [sic] on the universe of
proper defendants” (citation omitted) where the statute
does not establish one. I simply cannot agree with the
majority’s determination to strip from Everhart and
other ERISA plan beneficiaries and participants their
rights under the statute to sue parties that may be
liable for the payment of the benefits owed them.95
Judge Reinhardt’s dissenting opinion in Everhart
foreshadowed the Ninth Circuit’s en banc decision in 2011
overruling the Gelardi line of cases.96 However, even the second
line of cases do not follow the appropriate legal paradigm to its
reasonable end.

1249 (8th Cir. 1998)(permitting § 502(a)(1)(B) benefit claim against plan
administrator but not employer); and Garren v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 114
F.3d 186, 187 (11th Cir. 1997)(allowing benefit claim to proceed against party that
controlled claims decision)); and Everhart, 275 F.3d. at 758 (Reinhardt, J.,
dissenting). See also Hall v. LHACO, Inc., 140 F.3d 1190, 1194-1195 (8th Cir. 1998)
(identifying circuit split among cases).
93. See Everhart, 275 F.3d at 753-54.
94. Id. at 754.
95. Id. at 757, 762 (Reinhardt, J., dissenting) (citations omitted) (quoting Harris
Trust & Sav. Bank v. Salomon Smith Barney, Inc., 530 U.S. 238, 246 (2000) and
calling the majority opinion “patently incorrect.”).
96. Cyr v. Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co., 642 F.3d 1202, 1207 (9th Cir. 2011)
(en banc).
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C. THE BETTER CASES ALLOW SUIT VERSUS MOST ANY
PARTY IN CONTROL OF CLAIMS
Recall that the only citation in Gelardi to support its
holding that the plan and only the plan can be sued in a §
502(a)(1)(B) benefits claim was to ERISA section 502(d).97 The
second line of cases alternate to Gelardi initially allowed §
502(a)(1)(B) claims to proceed against the designated plan
administrator in addition to the plan, generally on the theory
that the plan administrator “controlled” the claims decision.98
97. See Gelardi v. Pertec Computer Corp., 761 F.2d 1323, 1324-1325 (9th Cir.
1985).
98. See Garren v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 114 F.3d 186, 187 (11th Cir.
1997) (per curium) (upholding dismissal of insurance company that served as claims
administrator but without discretionary authority, responsibility or control over plan
administration because insurer was not the named plan administrator and did not
control the claims decision); Layes v. Mead Corp., 132 F.3d 1246, 1249-1250 (8th Cir.
1998) (allowing claim versus plan administrator but not versus employer where plan
administrator controlled claims decision); Barkin v. Patient Advocates, LLC, 493 F.
Supp. 2d 119, 121-122 (D. Me. 2007) (noting circuit split regarding whether an action
for benefits under § 502(a)(1)(B) may be brought against the plan administrator,
citing cases, and holding that where the plan administrator controls the claims
decision it is a proper party defendant); Kellebrew v. UNUM Life Ins. Co. of Am., No.
H-06-0275, 2008 WL 1050664, at *2 (S.D. Tex. April 20, 2006) (refusing to dismiss
benefits claim against plan administrator that controlled claims decisions). Several
cases recite that a § 502(a)(1)(B) claim can proceed against the plan or a plan
fiduciary and that a plan administrator is such a fiduciary. See Terry v. Bayer Corp.,
145 F.3d 28, 35-36 (1st Cir. 1998); Curcio v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 33 F.3d
226, 233 (3d Cir. 1994); Taft v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc’y, 9 F.3d 1469, 1471
(9th Cir. 1993). In the cases allowing suit versus the plan administrator where the
administrator is designated to be a Committee of the plan sponsor’s employees,
courts have typically failed to explore the question of whether the administrator had
status as a legal person. See, e.g., Gelardi v. Pertec Computer Corp., 761 F.2d 1323,
1324-1325 (9th Cir. 1985); Boyer v. J.A. Majors Co. Emps.’ Profit Sharing Plan, 481
F. Supp. 454, 457-458 (N.D. Ga. 1979) (holding that employer company not a proper
party defendant where the Committee appointed to administer the plan was “a
viable, operating entity which, together with the trustee bank, was wholly
responsible for administering the profit sharing plan.”). However, several opinions
suggest that the plan administrator serves as an agent for the plan. See Leister v.
Dovetail, Inc., 546 F.3d 875, 879 (7th Cir. 2008) (Posner, J.) (remarking that if a suit
named and served the plan administrator that would be the equivalent of suing the
plan presumably because the plan administrator was the agent of the plan), or that a
judgment against the plan creates joint and several liability against the plan insurer.
See Pecor v. Northwestern Nat'l Ins. Co., 869 F. Supp. 651, 653 (E.D. Wis. 1994)
(stating in a very confusing passage that:
Suing and serving Fort Howard, in its capacity as plan
administrator, was sufficient to obtain jurisdiction over the Plan, but
does not provide a basis for suing Fort Howard in its capacity as
employer. The distinction determines which entity's assets could be
subject to a judgment. A suit for benefits is a suit against the plan,

BOGAN (DO NOT DELETE)

416

10/1/15 10:29 AM

BENEFITS & SOCIAL WELFARE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 16.2

Similarly focusing on the question of who controlled the claims
decision, several courts expanded the universe of defendants to
include “de facto” plan administrators—that is, parties who were
not named as the plan administrator, but who may have
received
delegated
authority
to
determine
claims.99
Consequently, we see cases where an insurance company
designated as a claims administrator or claims evaluator or
third-party administrator (TPA) with final authority to review
claims and discretion to determine claims was a proper party
defendant in a § 502(a)(1)(B) action.100 However, in a similar
circumstance where the “de facto” plan administrator/insurer
was not designated as the plan administrator and only provided
claims services without final authority to decide claims, the
alleged de facto administrator was found not to be a proper party
defendant.101 Additionally, under the line of cases focusing on
and in this case, a suit against the insurance company with whom
the plan contracted to provide the benefits at issue. Any judgment
obtained is a joint and several judgment against the assets of the
Plan and NNIC. It is not and should not be a judgment against the
general assets of the employer. Fort Howard is dismissed.
But how can a juristic person be an agent for a non-juristic person? The better view
is that the plan administrator is an agent for the plan sponsor that appointed the
administrator.
99. Compare Rosen v. TRW, Inc., 979 F.2d 191 (11th Cir. 1992) (holding that
employer who controls plan administration and is de facto plan administrator can be
held accountable under § 502(a)(1)(B)), with Crocco v. Xerox Corp., 137 F.3d 105 (2d
Cir. 1998) (rejecting de facto plan administrator theory of liability under §
502(a)(1)(B)). There is a circuit split of authority on the question of whether some
party other than the party designated as the plan administrator in the plan
instrument can be a de facto administrator of the plan subject to liability as a
fiduciary under § 502(a)(1)(B). See Hall v. LHACO, Inc., 140 F.3d 1190, 1195 (8th
Cir. 1998) (citing Jones v. UOP, 16 F.3d 141, 145 (7th Cir. 1994) (Posner, J.)). See
also Lifecare Mgmt. Servs. v. Insurance Mgmt. Adm’rs, 703 F.3d 835, 843-845 (5th
Cir. 2013) (holding that if a person other than the named plan administrator takes
on the role of a plan administrator and controls claims decisions such other person
may be liable in an ERISA benefits claim) (identifying split of authority and citing
cases).
100. See Evans v. Employee Benefit Plan, Camp Dresser & McKee, Inc., No. 073552, 2009 U.S. App. LEXIS 3426, at *557-61, *558 (3d Cir. Feb. 20, 2009). See also
Bernstein v. Citigroup Inc., No. 3:06CV209M, 2006 WL 2329385, at *3-7, 2006 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 54712 (N.D. Tex. July 5, 2006) (identifying split of authority and citing
cases). But see Ford v. MCI Commc’ns Corp. Health and Welfare Plan, 399 F.3d
1076, 1081-1082 (9th Cir. 2005) (holding that insurer designated as claims evaluator
and that received delegated authority to exercise discretion and to make final benefit
claim eligibility decisions but was not the formally named plan administrator was
not a proper party defendant in a § 502(a)(1)(B) claim for benefits); Blickenstaff v.
R.R. Donnelley & Sons Co. Short Term Disability Plan, 378 F.3d 669, 671-672, n. 1
(7th Cir. 2004).
101. See Garren v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 114 F.3d 186, 187 (11th Cir.
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control, employers who did not necessarily have expressly
delegated authority to decide claims (though a committee of
employees may have been designated as the plan administrator),
but who had assumed such authority, were found to be proper
party defendants.102
Certainly these cases improve on the Gelardi line, but the
focus on who controls the claims decision still fails to recognize
the contractual basis of the employee benefit promise and
obligation. Concentration on control as a basis for liability

1997) (per curium). See also Terry v. Bayer Corp., 145 F.3d 28, 35-36 (1st Cir. 1998)
(ruling in a disability benefits action against named defendants employer/plan
sponsor and the plan that court would review the plan administrator Committee’s
decision to deny benefits and not the insurer/TPA’s initial denial decision because
the services agreement between the insurer/TPA and the plan sponsor indicated that
the plan sponsor retained final authority to determine claims and administer the
plan though court did not decide whether the plan sponsor was a separate entity
from the Committee of plan sponsor employees that served as plan administrator).
102. See Musmeci v. Schwegmann Giant Super Markets, Inc., 332 F.3d 339, 349350 (5th Cir. 2003) (holding that where plan has no meaningful existence apart from
the employer and corporate employer/plan sponsor controls benefits decisions
employer may be liable in an ERISA benefits claim); Mein v. Carus Corp., 241 F.3d
581, 584-85 (7th Cir. 2001) (“While it is silly not to name the plan as a defendant in
an ERISA suit, we see no . . . reason to have this case stand starkly for the
proposition that the plan is always the only proper defendant . . . .”) (citing Riordan
v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 128 F.3d 549, 551 (7th Cir. 1997) (holding that where
employer corporation and the plan are closely intertwined employer can be sued in a
§ 502(a)(1)(B) action)); Rosen v. TRW, Inc., 979 F.2d 191, 192-193 (11th Cir. 1992)
(holding that if a corporate employer/plan sponsor exercises control as a de facto plan
administer it can be liable for ERISA violations including claim for benefits); Daniel
v. Eaton Corp., 839 F.2d 263, 266 (6th Cir. 1988) (holding employer that controlled
claims decision could be liable in ERISA benefits claim); Foulke v. Bethlehem 1980
Salaried Pension Plan, 565 F. Supp. 882 (E.D. Pa. 1983) (denying employer’s motion
to dismiss because evidence indicated that employer was actively involved in plan
administration). See also Law v. Ernst & Young, 956 F.2d 364, 373-374 (1st Cir.
1992) (holding that in a claim under ERISA § 502(c) for statutory penalties, a
corporate employer/plan sponsor that operated as a de facto plan administrator could
be liable); Leister v. Dovetail, Inc., 546 F.3d 875, 879 (7th Cir. 2008) (Posner, J.)
(suggesting that the when corporate employer failed to comply with formalities in
identifying and maintaining separate ERISA entities the company itself and two
principal shareholders could be liable in a participant’s benefits claim). But see
Curcio v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 33 F.3d 226, 240 (3d Cir. 1994) (McKelvie,
J., sitting by designation, dissenting) (“I believe that ERISA does permit a person to
sue an employer, regardless of whether or not the employer is a plan or a fiduciary...
Indeed, 29 U.S.C. § 1132(d) expressly contemplates that a person other than a plan
may be held liable. One of Congress’ primary purposes for enacting ERISA is ‘to
protect contractually defined benefits.’”) (internal citations omitted); Boyer v. J.A.
Majors Co. Emps.’ Profit Sharing Plan, 481 F. Supp. 454, 457-58 (N.D. Ga. 1979)
(holding that employer company was not a proper party defendant where a
designated Committee served as plan administrator wholly responsible for
administering the plan).
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suggests that § 502(a)(1)(B) claims are founded upon an imposed
legal duty, such as a tort duty or perhaps a fiduciary duty. But a
§ 502(a)(1)(B) claim seeks legal damages for breach of the plan
contract—it seeks to recover benefits due under the terms of the
written instrument. The plan is the instrument—the contract—
that details the plan sponsor’s promise to its workers. A trust
instrument also has “terms,” and there is a contractarian
component to trusts,103 but under ERISA, the trust is a separate
legal instrument from the plan (and a trust similarly does not
have status as a juristic person).104 The ERISA plan trust serves
as a form of security to assure that if it is determined that a plan
contract provides coverage, there will be funds available to pay
the claim and a legal person with assets, the trustee, that can be
served and that can be legally ordered to pay a judgment.105
Interestingly, Senator Javits’ initial pension reform bill106
proposed only to regulate pension plans, and it required all
pension plans to be funded through a trust or “fund,”107or
through the purchase of insurance.108 This first pension reform
bill also would have granted participants or persons entitled to
receive benefits from employee benefit funds or plans the right
to sue “any such fund or plan to recover benefits.”109 Under a
similar statutory model authorizing claims for breach of a
collective-bargaining agreement under LMRA § 301, the “fund”
is required to be organized and established as a trust, and the

103. See John H. Langbein, The Contractarian Basis of the Law of Trusts, 105
YALE L.J. 625 (1995).
104. See generally Lazenby v. Codman, 116 F.2d 607, 609 (2d Cir. 1940) (stating
that at common law a trust cannot sue or be sued because “it is not a juristic
person.”). See also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS, ch. 21, intro note (2012)
(remarking that “a trustee is personally liable on any contract made by the trustee,
even if the trustee acted properly.” However, a faultless trustee could be indemnified
from trust assets).
105. Notably, ERISA does not require that welfare plans be funded, see 29 U.S.C.
§ 1081(a)(1)(2012) (exempting welfare plans from ERISA’s funding requirements).
Consequently, in many welfare plans where the plan is unfunded or funded through
the purchase of an insurance policy, there is no trust at all. See, e.g., UNUM Life Ins.
Co. of Am., v. Ward, 526 U.S. 358 (1999) (fully insured disability benefits plan);
Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101 (1989) (unfunded severance
plan).
106. S. 1103, 90th Cong. (1967).
107. The bill defined an “employees’ benefit fund” to be a trust fund or a
contractual right under an insurance policy. See id. at § 2(4), (23).
108. See id. at § 2(4) (reciting that to the extent benefits under an employees’
benefit plan are provided through insurance “such plan shall not be deemed to
involve an employees’ benefit fund” as that defined in the bill).
109. Id. at § 504.
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statute provides for service of process on the fund trustee.110
The ERISA plan sponsor is the promisor under the plan
contract. Under contract law, the promisor is obligated to pay
the benefits detailed in the written plan instrument, assuming
that the covered worker has completed his or her part of the
bargain by performing the agreed upon labor. A recent Seventh
Circuit case, Larson v. United Healthcare Insurance Co.,111
finally approaches the issue from this correct legal paradigm,
ruling that plan insurers that both determine claims and pay
approved benefits can be sued under ERISA § 502(a)(1)(B), not
because they control the claims decision, but because they are
the contract obligors under the insurance policy purchased by
the plan sponsor to pay the promised benefits.112
In Larson, participants in various fully insured ERISA
health care benefit plans sued the insurers maintaining that the
insurers owed additional benefits to the participants under a
Wisconsin “mandated provider” health insurance law. The
participants read the state law to mean that health insurers in
Wisconsin could not charge participants a $30-$60 co-pay for
each of their visits to a chiropractor.113 The district court
granted the insurers’ motions to dismiss because the Seventh
Circuit had previously ruled that employee benefits are “‘an
obligation of the plan,” consequently, the plan is the logical and
normally the only proper defendant in a claim for benefits due
under § 502(a)(1)(B).114 The Seventh Circuit Larson court
repeated the general rule that the plan is ordinarily the only
proper party defendant, but found that general rule allowed for
110. See 29 U.S.C. § 185(d) (2013).
111. 723 F.3d 905 (7th Cir. 2013).
112. See id. at 913. See also Everhart v. Allmerica Financial Life Ins. Co., 275
F.3d 751, 759 (9th Cir. 2001) (Reinhardt, J., dissenting) (“I would hold that an
ERISA beneficiary may sue a third-party insurer who is legally responsible, by
contract, for the payment of ERISA benefits.”), overruled by Cyr v. Reliance
Standard. Life Ins. Co., 642 F.3d 1202, 1207 (9th Cir. 2011) (en banc); Curcio v. John
Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 33 F.3d 226, 240 (3d Cir. 1994) (McKelvie, J. dissenting)
(“I believe that ERISA does permit a person to sue an employer to enforce
contractual promises made by the employer, regardless of whether or not the
employer is a plan or a fiduciary.”).
113. See id. at 909 and n.2. Because the copayments amount was often more
than the cost of each chiropractor visit, the participants urged that allowing such
copayments violated the intent of the mandated provider law. The Larson court
ultimately ruled in favor of the insurers on the merits, finding that the Wisconsin
law did not prohibit such copayments. See id. at 918.
114. See Larson v. United Healthcare Ins. Co., No. 11–cv–473–bbc., 2012 WL
7179136, at 1, 4 (W.D. Wis. Jan. 3, 2012) (quoting Leister v. Dovetail Inc., 546 F.3d
875, 879 (7th Cir. 2008)).
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exceptions.115 Focusing on who was the obligor in the current
claims, rather than just the party that controlled the claims
decision (though admittedly the insurers filled both roles in this
case), the Larson court ruled that the insurers were proper
parties because they were the obligors under the plan
contract.116
The Larson case is most significant for its rationale,
recognizing that a plan is a contract and that breach of contract
actions are pursued against the contract obligor.117 The court
stated:
An ERISA § 502(a)(1)(B) claim “is essentially a contract
remedy under the terms of the plan.” The Supreme
Court has explained that the remedy provided in §
[502(a)(1)(B)] is designed “to protect contractually
defined benefits,” and in keeping with its contract-law
foundations, the cause of action offers typical contract
forms of relief, including recovery of benefits accrued or
otherwise due. . . . The claim is governed by a federal
common law of contract keyed to the policies codified in
ERISA.118
While several other courts prior to Larson expressly allowed
participants to sue plan insurers in their ERISA benefits claims
because the insurers controlled the claims decision,119 and
115. See Larson, 723 F.3d at 913.
116. See id. (reciting that: “Health plans are often structured around third-party
payors. When an employee benefits plan is implemented by insurance and the
insurance company decides contractual eligibility and benefits questions and pays
the claims, an action against the insurer for benefits due ‘is precisely the civil action
authorized by § 1132(a)(1)(B).’”) (quoting Cyr, 642 F.3d at 1207).
117. See Larson, 723 F.3d at 911.
118. Id. (internal citations omitted) (quoting Ponsetti v. GE Pension Plan, 614
F.3d 684, 695 (7th Cir. 2010), and Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473
U.S. 134, 148 (1985) (citing Jones v. Am. Gen. Life & Accident Ins. Co., 370 F.3d
1065, 1069 (11th Cir. 2004)); Burstein v. Retirement Account Plan of Emps. of
Allegheny Health Educ. & Research Found., 334 F.3d 365, 381 (3d Cir. 2003)
(“Claims for ERISA plan benefits under ERISA § 502(a)(1)(B) are contractual in
nature.”); Estate of Bratton v. National Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, Pa., 215
F.3d 516, 523 (5th Cir. 2000) (“ERISA § 502(a)(1)(B) . . . provides a contract based
cause of action to participants and beneficiaries to recover benefits, enforce rights, or
clarify rights to future benefits, under the terms of an employee benefit plan.”);
Mathews v. Sears Pension Plan, 144 F.3d 461, 465 (7th Cir. 1998) (“[T]he relevant
principles of contract interpretation are not those of any particular state’s contract
law, but rather are a body of federal common law tailored to the policies of ERISA.”).
119. See, e.g., Layes v. Mead Corp., 132 F.3d 1246, 1249 (8th Cir. 1998) (holding
that insurer serving as plan administrator that controlled claims decision could be
responsible in benefits claim); Am. Surgical Assistants, Inc. v. Great West
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innumerable courts allowed § 502(a)(1)(B) claims to proceed
against plan insurers without discussion of whether the insurer
was a proper party defendant,120 Larson appears to be the first
circuit court opinion that fully engages in an analysis of the
proper party defendant issue and then applies the proper
contract law-based paradigm to support its holding.121
III.

THE PLAN IS A CONTRACT AND THE PLAN
ADMINISTRATOR IS AN AGENT FOR THE
PROMISOR ON THE CONTRACT

A plan is a contract.122 Unfortunately, harkening back to
the Lochner era, ERISA courts have generally applied very
restrictive contract interpretation rules in ERISA breach of
contract claims.123 This is contrary to ERISA’s stated purpose to
Healthcare of Texas, Inc., No. H-09-0646, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13573 at * 7-11
(S.D. Tex. Feb. 17, 2010) (holding insurer serving as plan administrator with control
of claims decision could be liable in ERISA benefits claim); Cook v. Liberty Life
Assur. Co., No. 00-408, 2002 WL 482572, at *2, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5580, at *7 (D.
N.H. 2002) (same). But see Mote v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 502 F.3d 601, 610-11 (7th Cir.
2007) (upholding dismissal of plan insurer as not a proper party defendant, but not
clarifying whether the insurer was the plan obligor or just a service provider).
120. See, e.g., Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Glenn, 128 S. Ct. 2343 (2008); Aetna
Health Inc. v. Davila, 542 U.S. 200 (2004); Rush Prudential HMO, Inc. v. Moran, 536
U.S. 355 (2002); UNUM Life Ins. Co. v. Ward, 526 U.S. 358 (1999); Pilot Life Ins. Co.
v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41 (1987); Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58
(1987).
121. See also Everhart v. Allmerica Financial Life Ins. Co., 275 F.3d 751, 759
(9th Cir. 2001) (Reinhardt, J., dissenting) (the dissent recites that “both parties that
legally owe the benefits and parties that have the legal power to determine or pay
benefits because they administer them, are proper party defendants in an ERISA
suit under § [502](a)(1)(B).”).
122. See M & G Polymers USA v. Tackett, 135 S. Ct. 926, 929 (2015). See also
Cigna Corp v. Amara, 131 S. Ct. 1866, 1884 (2011) (Scalia, J., concurring in part)
(remarking that to reform the plan contract to conform with contrary representations
in the SPD, “the Court would be employing that doctrine to alter the terms of a
contract in response to a third party's misrepresentations—not those of a party to the
contract.”); Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 114 (1989) (“ERISA
was enacted to promote the interests of employees and their beneficiaries in
employee benefit plans and to protect contractually defined benefits[.]") (citations
omitted) (internal quotations omitted); Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Russell,
473 U.S. 134, 147 (1985) (ERISA § 502(a)(1)(B) presents a claim “to recover accrued
benefits, . . . under the provisions of the plan contract[.]”); Forsyth v. Humana, Inc.,
114 F.3d 1467, 1472-1475 (9th Cir. 1997) (comparing the breach of fiduciary duty
claim under ERISA § 502(a)(3) and claim for breach of the plan contract under 29
U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B)(2012).
123. See Fisk, Lochner Redux, supra note 7, at 155-161 (remarking that ERISA
courts have largely refused to apply modern theories of promissory estoppel and
equitable estoppel, instead reciting that they are bound to apply the strict terms of
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regulate private pension plans and thereby better protect
participants’ reasonable expectations to receive benefits under
ERISA than in pre-ERISA years.124
Consumer advocates
probably expected better outcomes for workers under ERISA and
modern contract law—which accounts for discrepancies in
bargaining power—than ERISA courts have produced.125 As a
consequence, at least one prominent commentator has urged
courts to reject pure contract law as the legal paradigm
governing ERISA plans and instead to develop a common law of
plans that would better promote Congress’s more participantprotective purposes.126 But our federal courts have generally not
accepted that challenge and have continued to apply laissez-faire
contract law principles, especially in welfare plan cases, for
example, to enforce aggressive reservation of rights clauses that
effectively guarantee unrestrained managerial power.127
the plan). Professor Fisk suggests that contract law should be informed by ERISA’s
public policy considerations under modern contract law to better achieve ERISA’s
overarching goals. Courts have expressed similar views. See, e.g., Larson v. United
Healthcare Ins. Co., 723 F.3d 905, 911 (7th Cir. 2013) (“The [502(a)(1)(B)] claim is
governed by a federal common law of contract keyed to the policies codified in
ERISA. The relevant principles of contract interpretation are not those of any
particular state’s contract law, but rather are a body of federal common law tailored
to the policies of ERISA.”) (internal citations omitted) (internal quotations omitted).
124. See 29 U.S.C. § 1001 (Findings and declaration of policy). See also Conison,
Foundations, supra note 5, at 633 (“[T]he undisputed main purpose of ERISA is to
help ensure the realization of benefit expectations that arise from these employer
programs. ERISA’s minimum standards, plan termination insurance provisions,
disclosure rules, fiduciary standards, and enforcement provisions are all designed to
help protect employee expectations. ERISA invests the priority of interests in a
benefit plan, rejecting the common law’s approach and instead strongly favoring
employee interests over those of the employer.”).
125. See Fisk, Lochner Redux, supra note 7, at 155-159 (noting that non-union
employee benefit plans are invariably written by the employer’s lawyers and are
seldom subject to negotiation between employers and individual workers, or in
insured plans even between the employer on behalf of their workers and the insurer,
and urging that ERISA courts, applying modern contract law, should recognize the
relative absence of notions of consent and negotiation that legitimate the use of
contracts as a form of social ordering).
126. See Conison, Foundations, supra note 5, at 589-618 and n. 64. Professor
Conison acknowledges the generally accepted history that courts first viewed an
employer’s promise to provide a pension benefit as a promise to make gift, and that
the courts eventually changed that viewpoint and began to enforce plan promises
under contract law, albeit under a restrictive liberty of contract theory. However,
Professor Conison rejects the contract law-based paradigm to resolve ERISA benefits
claims because that paradigm had not served employees well prior to ERISA, and it
has not served Congress’s protective purposes well under ERISA.
127. See Fisk, Lochner Redux, supra note 7, at 155. See, e.g., Owens v.
Storehouse, Inc., 984 F.2d 394, 397 (11th Cir. 1993) (holding that employer did not
discriminate against worker with AIDS in violation of 29 U.S.C. § 1140 when
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This is the case except when contract law provides process
protections for plan participants, such as the right to a de novo,
plenary trial governed by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in
a breach a contract action,128 the right to a jury trial in a breach
of contract claim seeking money damages,129 and when
participants sue the promisor under the plan contract—that is,
the plan sponsor, or the plan insurer in an insured plan. When
plan participants seek the protections of these well-established
contract law-based processes in their ERISA § 502(a)(1)(B)
claims, federal courts have ruled that trust law guides the
standard of review issue,130 and that the right to a jury trial is
generally inapplicable because a § 502(a)(1)(B) claim seeks
equitable relief or is incompatible with the summary
adjudication system developed under deferential review in
employer reduced lifetime cap for treatment of HIV-related conditions from generally
applicable cap of $1,000,000 to $25,000, reciting that plan reservation of rights
language gave sponsor the “full, absolute and discretionary right to amend, modify,
suspend, withdraw, discontinue or terminate the Plan in whole or in part at any time
for any and all participants of the Plan.”); McGann v. H & H Music Co., 946 F.2d
401, 408 (5th Cir. 1991), cert denied, 506 U.S. 98 (1992) (employer altered its group
medical plan by reducing benefits for AIDS-related claims from the generally
applicable lifetime cap of $1,000,000 to $5,000). ERISA generally prohibits plan
sponsors from altering or amending pension plan promises to vested participants
that would have the effect of reducing promised and earned pension benefits. See
ERISA §§ 201-208, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1058 (Part 2—Participation and Vesting), and
ERISA § 204(g), 29 U.S.C. § 1054(g) (Anti-cutback rule). See generally EMPLOYEE
BENEFITS LAW, supra note 25, at ch. 5.V. (Vesting and Benefit Accrual Rules).
128. See Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Glenn, 554 U.S. 105 (2008) (holding that
when ERISA courts apply an abuse of discretion standard of review in an ERISA
“review proceeding,” courts must count the plan administrator’s conflict of interest as
a factor in that abuse of discretion review). See generally EMPLOYEE BENEFITS LAW,
supra note 25, at ch. 13, IV. (Judicial Review).
129. See discussion and cases cited in footnote 131, infra.
130. See Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 110-114 (1989)
(suggesting that a deferential trust law-based standard of review should govern
ERISA § 502(a)(1)(B) claims if the plan sponsor empowers the plan administrator
with discretionary authority to determine eligibility for benefits). Firestone is a
schizophrenic opinion, waffling between the application of trust law and contract law
to govern ERISA § 502(a)(1)(B) benefit claims. Compare id. at 111 (“In determining
the appropriate standard of review for actions under § [502](a)(1)(B), we are guided
by principles of trust law.”), with id. at 114 (“ERISA was enacted to . . . protect
contractually defined benefits."), and id. at 112-113 (“The trust law de novo standard
of review is consistent with the judicial interpretation of employee benefit plans prior
to the enactment of ERISA. Actions challenging an employer's denial of benefits
before the enactment of ERISA were governed by principles of contract law. If the
plan did not give the employer or administrator discretionary or final authority to
construe uncertain terms, the court reviewed the employee's claim as it would have
any other contract claim by looking to the terms of the plan and other manifestations
of the parties' intent.”).
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ERISA benefit claims.131 And, as we have seen, participants
cannot sue the contract obligor under the employee benefit plan
contract, except now in the Seventh Circuit132 and presumably in
the Ninth Circuit.133 Given the proper party defendant cases, it
is necessary to briefly explore the contractual nature of employee
benefit plans and to examine how courts have treated the
promise to provide employee benefits in circumstances other
than in the standard of review and jury trial circumstances.
Historically, we have viewed the employment relationship
as founded upon the mutual agreements of employer and
employee, where in its simplest form, the worker agrees to
provide labor in exchange for the employer’s agreement to
provide compensation. The employment contract has been
increasingly regulated over the years. Laws have been enacted
to regulate worker hours, to prohibit discrimination in
employment, to mandate a minimum wage, and now the
Affordable Care Act mandates that private employers with a
minimum of fifty full time workers offer health insurance
coverage as part of the employment contract.134
131. See e.g., Blake v. Unionmutual Stock Life Ins. Co. of Am., 906 F.2d 1525,
1526-27 (11th Cir. 1990) (per curium) (citing cases) (striking demand for jury trial
because a § 502(a)(1)(B) action to recover money damages due under the plan for a
denial of benefits states a claim for equitable relief); Wardle v. Central States,
Southeast & Southwest Areas Pension Fund, 627 F.2d 820, 829 (7th Cir. 1980) (“We
conclude that Congress' silence on the jury right issue reflects an intention that suits
for pension benefits by disappointed applicants are equitable.”). Some district courts
have suggested that Firestone, 489 U.S. 101 (1989), discredited the decisions ruling
that a § 502(a)(1)(B) claim seeks equitable relief and therefore have refused to strike
a demand for a jury trial. See e.g., Hulcher v. United Behavioral Sys., 919 F. Supp.
879, 883 and n.5 (E.D. Va. 1995). See also Vaughn v. Owen Steel Co., 871 F. Supp.
247, 250-51 (D. S.C. 1994) (finding that a § 502(a)(1)(B) claim under ERISA is
analogous to state law contract claim and must be tried before a jury); Gangitano v.
NN Investors Life Insurance Co., 733 F. Supp. 342 (S.D. Fla.1990)(holding that
constitutional right to jury trial exists in § 502(a)(1)(B) action); Stamps v. Michigan
Teamsters Joint Council No. 43, 431 F. Supp. 745 (E.D. Mich. 1977) (holding that
claims under § 502(a)(1)(B) are legal rather than equitable and allowing jury trial).
See generally Plaintiff's Right to Jury Trial in Civil Action under § 502(a)(1)(B) of
Employee Retirement Income Security Act, 56 A.L.R. FED. 880 (Originally published
in 1982); EMPLOYEE BENEFITS LAW, supra note 25, at ch., 12 III.H. (Jury Trials).
132. See Larson v. United Healthcare Ins. Co., 723 F.3d 905, 913, 916 (7th Cir.
2013).
133. See Cyr v. Reliance Std. Life Ins. Co., 642 F.3d 1202, 1206-1207 (9th Cir.
2011).
134. Under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148,
124 Stat. 119 (2010), amended by the Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act
of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-152, 124 Stat. 1029 (2010) (codified at 42 U.S.C. and in
various section of the Internal Revenue code) [hereafter “ACA”], private employers
with more than 50 full-time equivalent employees are now generally required to
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In 1935, the Wagner Act first allowed workers to organize,
and it authorized labor organizations to collectively-bargain with
employers on behalf of their member workers “in respect to rates
of pay, wages, hours of employment, or other conditions of
employment.”135 In Inland Steel Co. v. National Labor Relations
Board,136 the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals held that
employers must collectively-bargain with unions to negotiate the
terms of employee benefit plans because employee benefits fit
within the definition of “conditions of employment” under the
Wagner Act.137 The United States Supreme Court has confirmed
that a collective-bargaining agreement is a contract, and that in
an action to recover damages for breach of a collectivebargaining agreement, the parties are entitled to a jury trial
under the Seventh Amendment of the United States
Constitution.138 Similarly, a plan is a contract,139 and like a
claim seeking damages for breach of a collective-bargaining
agreement under LMRA § 301, a participant seeking money
damages for breach of the plan contract under ERISA §
502(a)(1)(B) should enjoy the right to a de novo, plenary jury
trial in a suit against the obligor under the plan contract.140

provide health insurance coverage for their workers and their dependents up to age
26, or the employer will have to pay a penalty. See 26 U.S.C. § 4980H (known
commonly as the “employer mandate”).
135. See National Labor Relations Act (Wagner Act or NLRA), 49 Stat. 449, 29
U.S.C. § 151 et seq., amended by Labor Management Relations Act, 1947 (TaftHartley Act or LMRA), effective August 22, 1947, 61 Stat. 136, 29 U.S.C. § 141 et
seq.). NLRA section 8(5), now codified at 29 U.S.C. § 157, requires an employer “to
bargain collectively” with the representatives of his employees. Section 9(a), now
codified at 29 U.S.C. § 158(d), requires the employer and the representative of the
employees to meet and confer in good faith “with respect to wages, hours, or other
terms and conditions of employment . . . .”
136. 170 F.2d 247 (7th Cir. 1948).
137. See id. at 250.
138. See Chauffeurs, Teamsters and Helpers, Local No. 391, 494 U.S. 558, 569570 (1989) (holding in union workers’ fair representation action seeking money
damages versus the employer and union that underlying LMRA § 301 claim is
comparable to a breach of contract action and that the remedy sought legal relief
entitling parties to jury trial).
139. See M & G Polymers USA, LLC v. Tackett, 135 S. Ct. 926, 933 (2015) (“We
interpret collective-bargaining agreements, including those establishing ERISA
plans, according to ordinary principles of contract law, at least when those principles
are not inconsistent with federal labor policy.”).
140. See Mark D. DeBofsky, A Critical Appraisal of the Current State of ERISA
Civil Procedure — An Examination of How Courts Treat “Civil Actions” Brought
under the Retirement Income Security Act, 18 CHI.-KENT EM. RIGHTS & EMP. POL’Y J.
203 (2014); Donald T. Bogan and Benjamin Fu, ERISA: No Further Inquiry into
Conflicted Plan Administrator Claim Denials, 58 OKLA. L. REV. 637 (2005).
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In ERISA, Congress decided to regulate the employee
benefit contract for all workers, not just union workers.
Representative John Dent (D. Pa.), one of several Congressional
leaders, along with Senator Jacob Javits (R. N.Y.) and Senator
Harrison Williams (D. Pa.), who sponsored the primary ERISA
bills, H.R. 2 in the House and S. 4 in the Senate, stated that “we
started out with only one aim in view and that was to give a
pension participant his entitlements under the contract of the
pension plan he belonged to.”141 Congress was not trying to
create a new field of law in ERISA—it was just regulating the
plan contract, similar to how the states have regulated
insurance contracts by adopting consumer protections142 and
imposing mandates that are incorporated into the insurance
contract as a matter of law.143
Congress infused trust law principles into the employee
benefit contract through the imposition of fiduciary obligations,
and created separate remedies in ERISA § 502 for breach of
fiduciary duty144 and for other appropriate equitable relief.145
During the time Congress was considering ERISA, California
state courts first recognized that an insurer owed a duty of good
faith and fair dealing as an implied obligation under an
insurance contract and that an insurer may be liable in extracontractual damages for breach of that implied duty.146 ERISA’s
141. Remarks of Rep. Dent, reprinted in 3 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 8, at
4665.
142. See, e.g., STEPHEN S. ASHLEY, BAD FAITH ACTIONS: LIABILITY AND DAMAGES
ch. 9, 9-5 n.22 (2d ed. 1997) (describing the National Association of Insurance
Commissioners, Model Act Relating to Unfair Methods of Competition and Unfair
and Deceptive Acts in Practices in the Business of Insurance, and providing citations
to all the states that have adopted the Model Act).
143. See, e.g., Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724 (1985)
(holding that state insurance law, which required all applicable insurance policies
that provided health care benefits also include a minimum of $50,0000 of coverage to
treat mental health problems, is saved from ERISA preemption). See generally
Robert S. McDonough, ERISA Preemption of State Mandated-Provider Laws, 1985
DUKE L.J. 1194, at 1194-1196 n.8 (citing series of mandated-coverage laws enacted
by the various states as of the date of the article).
144. See 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(2)(2012).
145. See 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3).
146. See Gruenberg v. Aetna Ins. Co., 510 P.2d 1032, 1036-37 (1973); Crisci v.
Security Ins. Co., 426 P.2d 173 (Cal. 1967); Fletcher v. Western Nat. Life Ins. Co., 10
Cal. App. 3d 376, 89 Cal. Rptr. 78 (4th Dist. 1970). For earlier cases in the
development of the tort of bad faith breach of an insurance contract, see Comunale v.
Traders & General Ins. Co., 328 P.2d 198, 200-202 (1958); Hilker v. Western
Automobile Ins. Co., 231 N.W. 257 (Wis. 1930), aff’d on rehearing, 253 N.W. 413
(Wis. 1931); Brassil v. Maryland Cas. Co., 104 N.E. 622 (N.Y. 1914). See generally
ASHLEY, supra note 142 at ch. 2.
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imposition of fiduciary duties for administrators of plan
contracts creates obligations similar to the obligations imposed
on insurers under the duty of good faith and fair dealing.147 In
other parts of ERISA, Congress directly regulated the terms of
the employee benefit plan contract, for example, by mandating
that plan sponsors fund private pension plans.148 Congress also
detailed vesting rules that govern private pension plans,149
which plan sponsors generally cannot avoid through reservation
of rights clauses or other contrary plan language. ERISA’s
funding and vesting rules are effectively incorporated into the
pension plan contract the same way that statutory mandatedcoverage laws are impliedly incorporated into group health
insurance contracts under state insurance law, thereby
preventing the plan sponsor from contracting out of these ERISA
requirements.150
In ERISA, Congress federalized a worker’s contract law
remedy to recover benefits due under a plan by promulgating §
502(a)(1)(B).151 In Massachusetts Mutual Life Insurance Co. v.
Russell,152 the Supreme Court clearly identified the plan as a
contract and a § 502(a)(1)(B) benefit claim as one for breach of
the plan contract. Doris Russell was a Massachusetts Mutual
Life Insurance Co. employee and a member of the employer’s
self-funded disability benefits plan. She submitted a claim
under the plan seeking benefits, which she ultimately received.
However, due to the plan administrator’s alleged bad faith and
delay in processing the claim, Ms. Russell filed a lawsuit
(against her employer/plan administrator) seeking extracontractual damages. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals

147. ERISA courts have generally rejected claims for extra-contractual damages
arising from a breach of fiduciary duty under ERISA. See Massachusetts Mut. Life
Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134 (1985), overruling, Russell v. Massachusetts Mut.
Life Ins. Co., 722 F.2d 482 (9th Cir. 1983). See generally LEWIS ET AL., supra note 25,
at ch. 12 III.I. (Extracontractual Compensatory and Punitive Damages).
148. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 1081-85.
149. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 1051-58.
150. See, e.g., UNUM Life Ins. Co. of Am. v. Ward, 526 U.S. 358, 379 (1999)
(holding that state common law notice-prejudice law was incorporated into the
subject insurance contract to modify the policy notice provision and that noticeprejudice rule was saved from ERISA preemption).
151. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B). See 3 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 8, at 5284
(Staff Comment on the Senate bill dealing with Preemption of State Law and
Jurisdiction of State Courts: “The conferees may wish to follow the approach of the
House bill and also provide that State court jurisdiction with respect to employee
benefit plans is to extend only to contract actions.”).
152. 473 U.S. 134 (1985).
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upheld the claim under ERISA § 502(a)(2)153 (as the enforcement
arm for a breach of fiduciary duty under ERISA § 409),154 and
ruled that a participant could recover extra-contractual
damages—including punitive damages—for such a breach of
fiduciary duty.155
Notably, in Russell, Justice Stevens stated that if the
participant had not received all of her contract benefits, she
could have pursued an action under § 502(a)(1)(B) “to recover
accrued benefits . . . under the provisions of the plan contract.”156
Justice Stevens thereafter remarked that a “repeatedly
emphasized purpose” of ERISA was “to protect contractually
defined benefits.”157
In 2002, the Supreme Court examined the interrelation of
ERISA’s civil enforcement scheme in the context of an insurer’s
claim to enforce its contractual right to subrogation or
reimbursement under the terms of the plan. In Great-West Life
& Annuity Insurance Co. v. Knudson,158 the insurer had paid
medical bills for a plan participant, but then wanted to recoup
those payments when the plan beneficiary obtained a thirdparty tort recovery. Because the ERISA provision authorizing
recovery of contractual benefits, § 502(a)(1)(B), runs only to a
plan participant or beneficiary, Great-West could not sue under
ERISA to enforce its contractual rights. Consequently, GreatWest crafted its pleading as a claim for equitable relief under
ERISA § 502(a)(3).159
The Supreme Court held that despite Great-West’s
characterization of the claim as one for equitable restitution, it
was really seeking money damages, which were not available
under § 502(a)(3).160 Notably, while evaluating the nature of
Great West’s § 502(a)(3) claim, the Court contrasted that claim
for equitable relief with ERISA’s express remedy under §

153. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(2).
154. 29 U.S.C. § 1109.
155. See Russell v. Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co., 722 F.2d 482, 489-92 (9th
Cir. 1983). The Supreme Court overruled the Ninth Circuit’s holding that a
participant could recover punitive damages in a claim under ERISA § 502(a)(2). See
Russell, 473 U.S. at 145-48.
156. Russell, 473 U.S. at 147. Ms. Russell did not file a §502(a)(1)(B) claim to
recover benefits due under the terms of the plan because she had received, albeit
belatedly, all she was due under the plan contract. See Russell, 722 F.2d at 487.
157. Russell, 473 U.S. at 148.
158. 534 U.S. 204 (2002).
159. See id. at 210.
160. See id.
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502(a)(1)(B), which allows a plan participant “to enforce his
rights under the plan.”161
In the sole instance where the Supreme Court characterized
a § 502(a)(1)(B) claim as, perhaps, one for breach of fiduciary
duty, Justice Thomas, joined by Justices O’Connor and Scalia,
discredited that dictum in a persuasive dissenting opinion
passage. In Varity Corp v. Howe,162 workers sued their former
employer seeking individual relief under ERISA § 502(a)(3) for
breach of fiduciary duty. In Varity, a plan fiduciary allegedly
made misrepresentations that caused workers to release Varity
from its obligations under an existing plan in exchange for
coverage under a new plan with a new spin-off corporation. The
workers could not pursue their contractual claim for benefits due
under § 502(a)(1)(B) because they were no longer employees of
Varity or participants in the old plan. Instead, the workers
pursued a breach of fiduciary duty claim seeking individual
damages (and not damages on behalf of the plan) against Varity
for “other appropriate equitable relief” under 502(a)(3).163
Varity argued that ERISA only allows a claim for breach of
fiduciary duty under ERISA § 502(a)(2),164 and that to construe
the “other appropriate equitable relief” language of 502(a)(3) as
allowing individual damages for breach of fiduciary duty would
be redundant. Rejecting Varity’s redundancy argument, the
Varity majority mused that § 502(a)(1)(B) also provides a remedy
for breach of fiduciary duty.165
Justice Thomas directly
challenged that remark. He stated:
The majority apparently believes that § 502(a)(1)(B), 29
U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B), “provides a remedy for breaches
of fiduciary duty with respect to the interpretation of
plan documents and the payment of claims.” Ante, at
1077 (citing Russell, 473 U.S., at 144, 105 S.Ct. at 309).

161. See id. at 220-21. See also Mertens v. Hewitt Assocs., 508 U.S. 248, 255
(1993). In Mertens, the Court was similarly engaged in defining the parameters of a
claim for fiduciary breach, here under ERISA §502(a)(3).
In making that
comparison, the Court stated: “Money damages are, of course, the classic form of
legal relief.” Id. at 255. See also LaRue v. DeWolff, Boberg and Assocs., Inc., 552
U.S. 248, 257-58 (2008) (Roberts, C.J., concurring) (suggesting that the plan
participant’s characterization of her claim as one for equitable relief may have been a
ruse to avoid the limitations of ERISA’s breach of contract remedy under 29 U.S.C. §
1132(a)(1)(B)(2012)).
162. 516 U.S. 489 (1996).
163. See Varity, 516 U.S. at 515.
164. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(2).
165. See Varity, 516 U.S. at 512 (citing Firestone, 489 U.S. at 108, 109).
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Since, in the majority’s view, § 502(a)(1)(B) allows for
individual recovery for fiduciary breach outside the
framework created by §§ 409 and 502(a)(2), the
majority wonders ‘‘[w]hy should we not conclude that
Congress provided yet other remedies for yet other
breaches of other sorts of fiduciary obligation in
another, ‘catchall’ remedial section?’’ Ante, at 1077.
The answer is simple. Contrary to the majority’s
understanding, § 502(a)(1)(B) does not create a cause of
action for fiduciary breach, and Russell expressly
rejected the claim that it does. Thus, the entire
premise of the question is flawed. Section 502(a)(1)(B)
deals exclusively with contractual rights under the
plan.166
An action to recover benefits due under the terms of a plan
states a claim to recover money damages for breach of contract.
While trust law may inform the ERISA remedy for breach of
fiduciary duty under § 502(a)(2), trust law has no connection
with ERISA’s separate remedy to recover benefits due under a
the terms of a plan contract.
The law abounds with
circumstances where claimants may select from alternative
remedies governed by different legal paradigms.167 ERISA’s
legislative history establishes that Congress intended fiduciary
principles to supplement contractual obligations where
necessary, in order to secure protections for plan beneficiaries,
rather than to indiscriminately apply a body of law based upon
motivations of gratuitous transfers of property to all ERISA
plans and causes of action. Indeed, with respect to unfunded or

166. See id. at 521 n.2 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).
167. For example, doctors serve as fiduciaries to their patients. See Leslie J.
Miller, Informed Consent: I, 244 JAMA 2100, 2100 (1980). If a disgruntled patient
decides to sue her doctor, she may assert a negligence claim, or a breach of contract
claim, or a breach of fiduciary duty claim. If the patient chooses to pursue a breach of
contract claim against the doctor, courts do not apply trust law to the action and
courts do not defer to the doctor’s decision-making, simply because the doctor owed a
fiduciary duty to the patient. See Dingle v. Belin, 749 A.2d 157, 164 (Md. 2000)
(“Most [actions against doctors] are tort-based . . . and occasionally, in
misrepresentation or fraud; some are contract-based. When they are pursued either
alternatively or in combination, care must be taken to keep the actions separate and
not to allow the theories, elements, and recoverable damages to become improperly
intertwined.”). See also Rash v. J.V. Intermediate, LTD, 498 F.3d 1201, 1207 (10th
Cir. 2007) (fiduciary duty and breach of contract claims arising from employment
relationship); Garrett v. Bryan Cave, LLP, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 7339, *11-16 (10th
Cir. 2000) (unpublished) (citing Missouri and Oklahoma cases where both negligence
and breach of fiduciary duty claims were separately pursued against lawyers).
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insured welfare benefit plans, Congress contemplated
straightforward contractual rather than donative law principles
to govern benefit disputes:
[The fiduciary responsibility section] when read in
connection with the definition of the term “employee
benefit fund” makes it clear that the fiduciary
provisions apply only to those funds which leave assets
at risk. While [ERISA] has the effect of requiring all
retirement plans subject of that Act to be financed
through the medium of a segregated fund, there may be
welfare funds . . . such as those providing sickness or
disability benefits, which may not be funded. Thus, an
unfunded plan in which the only assets from which
benefits are paid are the general assets of the employer
is not covered.168
IV.

CONGRESS ATTEMPTED TO GRANT THE
PLAN JURAL EXISTENCE, BUT CONGRESS
DOES NOT CREATE PLANS AND ARGUABLY
CANNOT GIVE A PLAN EXISTANCE AS A
LEGAL PERSON

It is difficult at first reading to understand what Congress
intended to accomplish with the language in ERISA § 502(d),169
but reference to § 301(b) of the Labor Management Relations Act
(LMRA)170 provides guidance. The language in ERISA § 502(d)
appears to have been lifted directly from LMRA § 301(b),171
which recites that:
[a] labor organization may sue or be sued as an entity
and in behalf of the employees whom it represents . . .
Any money judgment against a labor organization . . .

168. S. REP. NO. 93-127, at 28-30 (1973), reprinted in 1 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY,
supra note 8, at 614-16.
169. See supra note 62 (reprinting 29 U.S.C. 1132(d) as enacted).
170. See 29 U.S.C. § 185(b).
171. 29 U.S.C. § 185(b) (Responsibility for acts of agent; entity for purposes of
suit; enforcement of money judgments) (“Any labor organization which represents
employees in an industry affecting commerce as defined in this chapter and any
employer whose activities affect commerce as defined in this chapter shall be bound
by the acts of its agents. Any such labor organization may sue or be sued as an entity
and in behalf of the employees whom it represents in the courts of the United States.
Any money judgment against a labor organization in a district court of the United
States shall be enforceable only against the organization as an entity and against its
assets, and shall not be enforceable against any individual member or his assets.”).
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shall be enforceable only against the organization as an
entity and against its assets, and shall not be
enforceable against any individual member or his
assets.172
A Senate Report supporting the amendment to LMRA § 301
to add subpart (b) provides background explaining why Congress
wanted to allow unions to sue and be sued as an entity.173 The
Senate Report explains the problem corporate employers faced in
the early years of labor negotiations when they had difficulty
enforcing labor contracts with labor unions.
Unions are typically organized as unincorporated
associations.174 The enactment of the Wagner Act175 in 1935
granted unions the right to represent workers and to bargain
collectively with employers on behalf of members. Collectivebargaining contracts are enforceable under LMRA § 301 by both
management and by the labor organization that are parties to
the contract.176 However, when corporate employers sought to
enforce collective-bargaining agreements prior to the LMRA,
they often found that the union was not a legal person that could
be served with process,177 and union assets could not be reached
to pay any damage judgment or to enforce any decree entered
against the union as an unincorporated association.178

172. See id.
173. See S. REP. 105, 80TH CONG. 1ST SESS. at 15-18 (March 24, 1947), reprinted
in LEGIS. HISTORY OF THE LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATIONS ACT, (March 24, 1947) at
421-424 (1985) [hereinafter NLRB Print].
174. See id. at 16, 1 NLRB Print, supra note 173 at 425.
175. See National Labor Relations Act of 1935, 49 Stat. 449 (1935) (codified at 29
U.S.C. §§ 151–169 (1935) (Wagner Act)). See also 29 U.S.C. § 151 (declaring in part
that: “The inequality of bargaining power between employees who do not possess full
freedom of association or actual liberty of contract, and employers who are organized
in the corporate or other forms of ownership association substantially burdens and
affects the flow of commerce, and tends to aggravate recurrent business depressions,
by depressing wage rates and the purchasing power of wage earners in industry and
by preventing the stabilization of competitive wage rates and working conditions
within and between industries.”).
176. See 29 U.S.C. § 185(a). See also Lewis v. Benedict Coal Corp., 361 U.S. 459,
467-69 (1960) (holding in an action by the trustee of a union benefit fund that the
corporate employer’s asserted counterclaim against the union could not reach the
trustee or the assets of the fund because the trustee (as representative of the fund)
was a separate legal person from the union).
177. See S. REP. 105, 80TH CONG., 1ST SESS. at 16 (March 24, 1947), 1 NLRB
Print, supra note 173, at 425 (citing Grant v. Carpenters’ District Council, 322 Pa. 62
(Pa. Sup. 1936)).
178. See id. at 17; 1 NLRB Print, supra note 173, at 425 (citing Aalco Laundry
Co. v. Laundry Linen Union, 115 S.W.2d 89 (Mo. App. 1938)). Additionally, the
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Consequently, we know that Congress enacted LMRA §
301(b), declaring that a union can sue and be sued as an entity,
because unions, as unincorporated associations, could not be
served or sued or otherwise held responsible under a legal
judgment or decree because the union did not exist as a legal or
“juristic” person. In response to state law that often prevented a
corporate employer from enforcing a collective-bargaining
agreement, Congress added LMRA § 301(b) to provide some
basis in federal law for courts to obtain power over
unincorporated unions and for corporate employers to obtain an
enforceable judgment or decree against a union.
Congress declared that a union can sue and be sued as an
entity, but LMRA § 301(b) lacks the “unless” clause in ERISA §
502(d)(2).179 This is a crucial difference because the “unless”
clause in ERISA § 502(d)(2) necessarily contemplates that
parties other than the plan can be sued in an ERISA benefits
claim.180 But beyond that difference, the question still arises,
does Congress’s declaration that a non-juristic entity—a plan—
can sue and be sued, in and of itself, create a legal person?
Assuming that a union is an unincorporated association, it is
still an association of legal persons (individual workers); but a
plan, and particularly an unfunded plan, is just a promise
written down on a piece of paper—it is a contract.181 And
Congress is not even a party to the contract, which is an
agreement between private parties (the employer/plan sponsor
and the workers). Does Congress create a legal person by simply
declaring in a statute that a contract between private parties
can sue and be sued?
In M’Culloch v. Maryland,182 the Supreme Court held that
Congress can charter and thereby create a corporation because
that is a “necessary and proper” use of Congress’s commerce

Senate Report found that: “the National Labor Relations Board has held it an unfair
labor practice for an employer to insist that a union incorporate or post a bond to
establish some sort of legal responsibility under a collective bargaining agreement.”
Id. at 15, 1 NLRB Print, supra note 173, at 425.
179. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(d)(2)(“Any money judgment . . . against an employee
benefit plan shall be enforceable only against the plan as an entity and shall not be
enforceable against any other person unless liability against such person is
established in his individual capacity . . . .”) (emphasis added).
180. See Cyr v. Reliance Std. Life Ins. Co., 642 F3d 1202, 1206-1207 (9th Cir.
2011).
181. ERISA requires that “[e]very employee benefit plan shall be established and
maintained pursuant to a written instrument.” 29 U.S.C. § 1102(a)(1).
182. 17 U.S. 316 (1819) (Marshall, C.J.).
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clause power.183 But in M’Culloch and in a subsequent United
States Bank case, Osborn v. Bank of the United States,184 the
Court focused on the fact that Congress adopted a specific
statute, which served as the Bank’s charter, to create the
Bank.185 One of the powers granted in the charter was the
power to sue and be sued, but there was also a lot more to the
charter.186 Effectively, the statute served as the corporate
charter creating a legal person; and in the same statute
Congress granted the newly created legal person the power to
sue and be sued. It is unclear, however, whether by merely
declaring in a statute that a non-juristic entity can sue and be
sued, Congress has done enough to create a legal person.
It appears that Congress included § 502(d) in ERISA
because it recognized that a plan was not a legal person and
because it wanted to allow suits against an ERISA plan
(particularly multi-employer plans) in similar fashion to how the
LMRA allows suits against unions. Unfortunately, ERISA does
not define the term entity; and an entity is not necessarily a
legal person. According to Wikipedia, a stone can be an
entity.187 Could Congress declare, in any particular statute, that
a stone, like a plan, can sue and be sued as an entity? If
Congress declares that something—anything—that is not a
juristic person can sue and be sued, does that naked declaration
thereby give such thing the status of a juristic person?
Fortunately, this interesting question should not have any
practical bearing on how ERISA benefits claims are prosecuted,
so long as a participant is not restricted to suing only the plan.188
183. See id. at 406-421.
184. 22 U.S. 738 (1824) (Marshall, C.J.).
185. See id. at 823-24; M’Culloch, 17 U.S. at 317-18.
186. See Osborn, 22 U.S. 738 at 816-17.
187. “An entity is something that exists in itself, actually or potentially,
concretely or abstractly, physically or not. It need not be of material existence. In
particular, abstractions and legal fictions are usually regarded as entities. In
general, there is also no presumption that an entity is animate. The word may refer,
for example, to Bucephalus, the horse of Alexander; to a stone; to a cardinal number;
to a language; or to ghosts or other spirits.”
188. Does the fact that Congress declared that a union can sue and be sued as an
entity necessarily mean that a union is a legal person? Congress does not create
unions, or plans, and neither LMRA § 301(b) nor ERISA § 502(d) involves the
exercise of Congressional power to charter a federal corporation. See M’Culloch v.
Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 406-424 (1819). Exploration of this point is beyond the scope
of this paper. For purposes of this paper, so long ERISA § 502(d) is applied to allow
participants to sue the plan sponsor or plan insurer or any other obligor on the
employee benefit plan contract, the fact that they may also sue the plan as an entity
will have limited practical consequence.
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CONCLUSION

ERISA § 502(d) does not limit the universe of defendants
that can be sued to recover benefits due under the terms of an
employee benefit plan. Congress’s declaration that a plan can
sue and be sued as an entity presents complex questions. What
is Congress’s authority to declare a thing subject to suit, when
that thing is not a creation of Congressional action in the first
place (the private parties create the plan contract, not Congress),
and does not otherwise have status as a juristic person. If courts
allow participants and beneficiaries in § 502(a)(1)(B) claims to
sue plan sponsors or insurers that are the obligors under a plan
contract, however, that issue will presumably have little
practical significance.
The declaration in ERISA § 502(d) that a plan can sue and
be sued as an entity does not mean that a plan is the only party
that can be sued in an ERISA benefits claim. In Harris Trust,
the Supreme Court made that absolutely clear in a case arising
under ERISA § 502(a)(3), where the very same circumstances
applied—that is, neither § 502(a)(3), nor § 502(a)(1)(B) expressly
limits the field of possible defendants that can be sued under
either of those ERISA § 502 subparts. A plan is a contract, and
as the Seventh Circuit recently held, it is the obligor under the
plan contract that should be pursued in an ERISA benefits
claim. Allowing participants to sue the party that is actually
responsible to pay benefits due under the terms of a plan makes
perfect sense, comports with Congressional policy in enacting
ERISA, and is true to the real undertakings of the parties when
a plan is established.
Further, recognizing that a plan is contract, courts should
apply contract law-based processes to govern ERISA §
502(a)(1)(B) claims to recover benefits due under the terms of a
plan. That not only means that the promisor under the plan
contract a proper party defendant in a §502(a)(1)(B) action; it
also means that courts should process such breach of contract
claims as de novo, plenary actions, without deferring to one of
the parties to the contract (the plan administrator as agent for
the plan sponsor/insurer), while also guaranteeing the parties’
right to a jury trial under the Seventh Amendment to the United
States Constitution.

